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MONOPOLISTIC LAND TENURE AND FREE TRADE
IN MEXICO: RESURRECTING THE GHOST OF
PORFIRIAN ECONOMICS
Lola Clayton Rainey*
[O]metecutliel senor de la dualidady Omecihuatl la isenora
de la duailidad,recorreronel mundo de la noche eterna aborda
dos cocodrilos. ("Ome" en nahuatI signifca dos). Ellos tuvieron
cuatro hijos: Quetzalcoatl, Tezacatlipoca, Camaxtle y Huitzilopochtli, a cada uno le otorgarondistintascualidadesparaque
crearany protegieranLa Tierra ... Tezcatlipoca y Quetzalcoatl
escogieron un monstruo que tenia el cuerpo regado de ojos y
bocas y lo hicieron bajardel cielopara convertirlo en "senorade
la tierra"pero abajo de la gran capula celeste solo habiaagua,
y la bestia iba de un lado a otro sin ningun orden. Entonces,
Tezcatlipoca y Quetzalcoatlplanearonconvirtirse en dos grandes
serpientespara dominara la bestia y poder darleforma a lo que
seria La Tierra. Fue tanto el jaloneo con el monstruo, que este
termino por romperse . .. y asi, con una parteformaron el cielo
y con la otra la tierrafirme .... '
[Olmetecutli the master of duality and Omecihuatlthe mistress
of duality traveled world of eternal night aboardtwo crocodiles.
("Ome" in nahuatl means two). They hadfour sons Quetzalcoatl,
Tezcatlipoca, Camaxtle and Huitzilopochtli, each one possessed
special powers for the creation and protection of the world...
Tezcatlipoca and Quetzalcoatlselected a monsterthat had a body
sprinkled with eyes and mouths and they came down from heaven
in order to change it into "mother earth". But under the great
celestial stratum there was only water and the beast moved from
one side to the other at random. Therefore, Tezcatlipoca and
Quetzalcoatl agreed to change themselves into two serpents to
subdue the beast so they could transform it into land. A fierce
struggle with the monster ensued and when it was over the beast
had broken itself into pieces . . . and so, with one part they
formed the sky and with the other solid land... .2
*Solo Practitioner, Law Offices of Lola Clayton Rainey, P.C. L.L.M. 1997, J.D. 1982, B.A.
1979, University of Arizona. Special thanks to: Francisco Avaos and Professors Robert Williams
and David Gantz for their support and guidance.
1. NELIDA GALVAN, MrroLoGIA MEXICANA PARA NiNos 16 (1995).

2. BRIAN M. FAGAN, THE AzTECs 213 (1984). "The Aztec philosophers thought of the earth
as supported by the universal, primeval sea, teoatl. In this sea floated a terrible monster that took
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Introduction

Free trade is not a panacea for the myriad of ills afflicting Mexican
society. In order to receive the maximum benefits of a free marketplace, a
culture of fairness must exist because political and economic stability are a
prerequisite to trade growth? Standards of fairness are norms that have yet
to take root in Mexican culture.4 The attempts to transform the ideology of
fairness into institutional standards of fairness have failed because neutralizing
or equalizing social practices threaten the political status quo.
The Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI), the dominant national

political party of Mexico, for over thirty years managed to control the balance
of power between the mainly bourgeoisie class, demanding capitalist
expansion, and the worker class, seeking land redistribution, through a mixed
policy of pan y palo (bread and stick).s This coalition of antipathetic forces
was formed in the post-revolutionary era of Mexico.6 Over the years,

however, the move toward increased capitalization has expanded the influence
of the industrial elite in the national government, particularly in the area of
economic policy, and strengthened their position as the dominant class in civil
society.7 Concomitantly, the political power and stability of the worker class

has weaned.
The state, acting in its traditional paternalistic role as social arbiter, has

been unable to institute needed land and fiscal reforms to ease growing class
antagonism because of fierce opposition to such reforms from the industrial
elite.' The resulting power gridlock has led to a loss of faith in the political

several forms. One of its forms was the Earth Monster, Cipactli, the crocodile-like creature that
had once been torn asunder to form heaven and earth." Id. at 219.
3. See Boris Kozoichyk, PoliticalChange and Instability,18 CAL. W. INT'L L. J. 105 (1987).
4. See CARLOS G. VELEZ-IBANEZ, RrrUAL OF MARGINALITY 18, 29 (1983), quoted in
Kozolchyk, supra note 3, at 106.
5. See STEVEN E. SANDERSON, AGRARIAN POPULISM AND THE MEXICAN STATE: THE
STRUGGLE FOR LAND IN SONORA 218 (1981) [hereinafter STEVEN SANDERSON, AGRARIAN
POPULISM]. The PRI's stranglehold on political power in Mexico was weakened for the first time
in 68 years as a result of the July 6,1997, elections. For the first time since 1929, the PRI is not
the majority party in the Mexican Congress. Opposition parties formed an alliance which intends
to wrest control over key congressional committees from the hands of the PRI. The opposition
is also threatening to reform the Mexican presidency by bringing an end to the imperialistic
excesses of the office. See State of Union to Mark Change for Zedillo, PRI, ARIz. DAILY STAR,
Aug. 31, 1997, at 5A.
6. The coalition is based on a simple principle of mutual annihilation. This means that each
group understands that continuation of conflict can only end in their mutual destruction. See
STEVEN SANDERSON, AGRARIAN POPULISM, supra note 5, at 211.
7. See id. at 218.
8. Although referring specifically to the administration of Echeverria, the same can be said
of the Salinas and Zedillo presidencies. See id. at 220.
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apparatus of the state.9 The goal of this weakened national government must
be to restore the public confidence in its authority. This will inevitably result
in the pacification of the industrial elite through a retreat from reform
measures and an acquiescence to policies that promote or protect the interests
of the dominant class.
The introduction of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)
into this volatile sociopolitical climate is reminiscent of the Porfirio Dfaz freetrade era. Dfaz's implementation of state policies that favored the bourgeoisie,
in its nascent and less potent stage, resulted in massive unemployment,
dislocation, and impoverishment of Mexican laborers, particularly Indians, and
their families. In the aftermath of the brutal repression of opposition to his
failed free-trade policies, the Dfaz regime was toppled. The lesson learned
from the Porfirian experiment with free trade is this: the introduction of freetrade policies to an oligarchic society, to a country controlled by monopolistic
business practices, fans the flames of revolution.
Lastly, it was the struggle for land, a subject which continues to dominate
the polemics of the widening class chasm, that sparked the last revolution.
The torch bearers of the last revolution, however, were not the Mexican
campesinos, who continued to hope for social and political inclusion, but the
Indians of Mexico, the social outcasts, who understood that the language of
capitalism is war. If NAFTA resurrects the ghost of Porfirian economic
policies, the rumbling of discontent emanating from the Indian villages in
Chiapas may be a forewarning of difficult times ahead.
L HistoricalBackground
An idea endemic to a democratic, liberal understanding of the world is a
belief in the supremacy of humans beings over all living things."0 The JudeoChristian belief in the preeminence of human beings in the natural world is
the source of an important corollary idea: the separation of man from
nature - separation caused by his elevation above it. Man, in his exalted
status, has unfettered powers of dominion. However, man himself is
subordinated to a higher authority because the natural world order is governed
by a parallel moral hierarchy. This hierarchy is one in which moral obligation
extends upward from man to God, laterally from man to man, but not
downward from man to lesser life forms. The theological basis for the

9. "Leading factions of the bourgeoisie became willing, in the 1970's, to act as ruler of civil
society independent of the political will of the state .... ' Id. (speaking of the strife-laden years
under Mexican President Echeverria).
10. See E.T. Freyfogle, The Ethical Strands of Environmental Law, 4 U. ILL. L. REv. 819,

830 (1994). "General Christian theory, derived from Roman theory and augmented by numerous
glossators and theologians, held that there was a natural law binding upon all people and peoples
wherever they might be. That law was inherent in the universe and in man .... " WOODROW W.
BORAH, JusTIcE BY INSURANcE 6 (1983).
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superiority of man stems from the Judeo-Christian belief in the existence of
the human spirit or soul which permits man to act morally." These ideas
were ingrained in the belief systems of Western societies who developed an
objective or utilitarian view of nature; that is to say, the value of nature was
determined by the uses or benefits men derived from it. The conceptualization
of land and other natural resources as property emerged from Christian
theologl, embodied in the utilitarian view of nature, and from Roman Law.
When Hernd Cortds arrived on the shores of the southeastern parameters
of the Aztec empire, in what is now the state of Veracruz, Mexico, he came
in search of gold and silver and the Indian labor needed to extract wealth.'3
Instead, he encountered a mighty civilization built on an ideology which was
the antithesis of Western thought. 4 The Spanish distinction between civilized
and barbaric peoples provided the conquistadors with a conceptual framework
they used to shape their perception of the non-Christian and nonwhite
inhabitants of pre-colonial Mexico. 5 In accordance with the directives of the
Catholic. Church, a partner in the program of Spanish and Portuguese
expansion, the strategy for conquest of Mexico included the goal of
transforming the native "barbaric" inhabitants into "civilized" subjects worthy
of European rule. 6 Thus, the Spanish occupation of Mexico, although driven
primarily by economic interests, marked the beginning of an ideological war
that led to the systematic dismantling of the indigenous culture. 7
After the conquest of Mexico, the Spanish Crown moved quickly to enrich
itself with the vast natural resources of its new colony. Spain initially
concentrated on the development of industries that produced commodities in
high demand among its European trading partners and colonies. 9 The

11. See Kent Greenawalt, The Limits of Rationality and the Place of Religious Conviction:
ProtectingAnimals and the Environment, 27 WM. & MARY L. REV. l011, 1021 (1986) ("Mhe
subjects of moral duties undoubtedly must have moral capabilities, and among creatures on earth,
those capabilities may exclude all but humans.").
12. Roman geometric logic is the source of Roman commercial law which establishes a
hierarchy of rights and duties.
Roman law enabled measurement of graphic representations of the physical world.
Thereafter, it was possible to analogize, say, a fee simple absolute to a perfect
quadrangle, and an easement to a rectangle or triangle within the quadrangle. The
geometric analogy, then, provided a means with which to measure previously
unmeasurable non-corporeal rights and duties.
Boris Kozolchyk, On the State of Commercial Law at the End of the 20th Century, 8 ARIZ. J.
INT'L COMP. L. 1, 4 (1991).
13. See ANDRE GUNDER FRANK, MEXICAN AGRICULTURE 1521-1630, at 4 (1979).
14. See FAGAN, supra note 2, at 4.
15. See EDWARD HOLLAND SPICER, CYCLES OF CONQUEST: THE IMPACT OF SPAIN, MEXICO,
AND THE UNITED STATES ON THE INDIANS OF THE SoUTHwEsr, 1533-1960, at 281 (1962).
16. Id.
17. See FAGAN, supra note 2,at 279.
18. See FRANK, supra note 13, at 2.
19. See id.
("[Tihe type of economy which the Iberian metropolis organized was of a definite
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profitability of commercial agriculture in colonial Mexico precipitated a shift
of investment capital to agricultural production. The resulting demand for
arable land, which was tightly controlled by the Spanish government,2
became a catalyst for legal reforms that increased private ownership of real
property.'
The principal beneficiaries of the early land distribution had been the
Crown, the Catholic Church, and the conquistadors and their families.' The
Crown, endeavoring to thwart the development of feudal estates in its
colonies, enacted laws which impeded private ownership by limiting the
ability of individual colonists to accumulate land.' This changed with the
development of a market for real property, a market largely created by greedy
land speculators and unscrupulous landholders who found ways to maneuver
around legal barriers.' The Monarchy, unable to stop the privatization of
land, acquiesced to the demands of the marketplace.? The Spanish
government's more favorable disposition toward private land acquisitions
accelerated the redistribution of Indian lands to Spanish owners. The legal
rights and privileges created as a result of this redistribution of land reified
social and economic relationships which are still an integral part of Mexican

society.
The political hegemony of colonial Mexico was forged in the chaos and
brutality of worlds colliding. In the wake of this cataclysmic event, the top

colonial nature, oriented to the Central and West European markets.
...
); SERGIO BAGU,
ECONOMIA DE LA SOCIEDAD COLONIAL: ENSAYO DE LA HISTORIA COMPARADA DE AMERICA
LATINA [ECONOMY OF COLONIAL SOCIETY: ESSAYS OF LATIN AMERICA COMPARED HISTORY]
39, 68, 260 (1949), quoted in FRANK, supra note 13, at 36.
20. See FRANK, supra note 13, at 17; see Ross HAssIG, TRADE, TRIBUTE, AND TRANSPORTATION 225 (1985).
21. See FRANK, supra note 13, at 22.
22. See id. at 23.
23. See id. at 10. See generally FAGAN, supranote 2, at 279-96 (presenting an overview of
the collapse of the Aztec Empire after the Spanish conquest).
24. The encomienda system which developed was of particular concern to the Spanish
monarchy because of its feudal-like organization. The Crown used judicial bodies known as
audiencas to investigate and legally eliminate the ecomiendas. Eventually these type of land
holdings disappeared in the colony. See Colin M. MacLachlan, Criminal Justice in Eighteenth
Century Mexico, in JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN & DAVID S. CLARK, COMPARATIVE LAW:
WESTERN EUROPEAN AND LATIN AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEMS 158, 162 (1978).
25. See FRANK, supra note 13, at 22, 23, 60.
26. See id. at 67-71.
27. See ROGER BARTRA, ESTRUCTURA AGRARIA Y CLASES SOCIALES EN MEXICO
[AGRARIAN STRUCTURE AND SOCIAL CLASSES IN MEXICO] 105 (1974). Bartra applies Marxist
economic principles to explain the Mexican class struggle over land. He describes land tenure
in Mexico as primarily an arrangement of social and economic relationships expressed in legal
terms. "Lasformas de propiedadde la tierrason una mera situacionjuridicaformal;constituyen
relacionessocialesy economicasque generanformasjuridicasparticulares.
" ["The forms of land
tenure are not only formal legal arrangements; they constitute social and economic relationships
that generate particular legal forms."]. Id.
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level of the native social structure, consisting of the regality, sarcedotes, and
military leaders, was destroyed.' The Spanish Crown, in order to minimize
the disruption and loss of Indian productivity, grafted its colonial government
onto the body of the native government in hopes of facilitating a constructive
transfer of power 9 The stunned and traumatized aboriginal peoples, their
ranks decimated by disease and inhumane treatment, had no direct link to the
reconstituted monarchical political regime." Their political status was
determined by Spanish bureaucrats acting under a misguided policy of
noblesse oblige, a system that stymied the development of a strong, independent, Indian voice in colonial government.3' By the time this system was
abandoned, native peoples had been relegated to a periphery role in the
internal politics of Mexico. Their political status did not improve in postcolonial Mexico. Although recognized as Mexican citizens, Indians were
politically marginalized. During this era, their lands were confiscated as a part
of a "revolutionary vision" of land reforms that led to reentrenchment of
colonial land distribution patterns. However, criollos?' and foreigners
assumed a more dominant position among the class of property owners.
Nevertheless, the vast majority of criollos and Indians remained propertyless.
The unequal distribution of land in Mexico has caused a divisive class
struggle between the privileged propertied elite and the disenfranchised
propertyless masses. It is an epic struggle that has corrupted many of the
country's social institutions, including the legal system. Law, whether
emanating from the political or juridical spheres of government, has been the
primary legitimizing authority for Mexico's monopolistic land owners. By
pandering to the interests of the privileged elite, the Mexican legal system has
traditionally protected and empowered the hacendados.33 The complacency
of the legal system and the complicity of other public and private institutions
in the propagation of the hacienda helped to solidify its status as the
predominant form of land tenure in Mexico.'
Mexico's ratification of North America Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA or
the Agreement), however, was supposed to mark the beginning of a new

28. See FAGAN, supra note 2, at 279-96.
29. See FRANK, supra note 13, at 4, 5.
30. See id. at 5. See generally BORAH, supra note 10 (detailing the various legal measures

taken by the Spanish Monarchy to protect Indian tribes after the conquest of Mexico).
31. See generally BORAH, supra note 10.
32. See FAGAN, supra note 2, at 290. Fagan explains that the word criollos refers to
Spaniards born in the New World. They held a lower social status than the peninsulares,people
of Spanish birth who emigrated to the colony. Criollosincluded mestizos, Indian and Spanish
birth, and mulattoes, people of Black and Spanish birth. See id.
33. The term hacendado refers to the owner of a large land estate known as latifundia or
haciendas.
34. See FRANK, supra note 13, at 67-71.
35. Dec. 17, 1992, U.S.-Mex.-Can., 32 I.L.M. 289,605 (1993); see NAFTA Implementation
Act, 19 U.S.C. §§ 3301-3473 (1994) (enacted as of Jan. 1, 1994).

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol23/iss2/2

No. 2]

LAND TENURE & FREE TRADE IN MEXICO

223

era. Can Mexico simultaneously embrace free trade and monopolistic
capitalism? If the Porfirian experiment with free trade and monopolistic
capitalism in Sonora is an indication of what the future holds in store for
Mexico under NAFTA, the answer to the foregoing question is, "no."
Traditionally the most marginalized segment of the Mexican labor force
has been the workers dependent on the land: the campesinos, ejidos,
jornaleros,and peones. It is within this bottom stratum that most of Mexico's
indigenous people (los indigenas) are found. Their precarious status in
Mexican society can be attributed to the same economic policies that fostered
the creation of the latifundio. Examining the effect that privatization has had
on the communal lands of one Mexican indigenous tribe, the Chatino of
Oaxaca, Mexico, may provide insight into the harsh realities and choices
facing the impoverished Indian communities struggling for survival in an
increasingly hostile environment. More importantly, by understanding the
economic pressures facing the embattled Chatino, one has a greater understanding of the cultural crisis facing Indian tribes in Mexico.
II. The Pre-ColonialEpoch
One of the important variables in the successful conquest of indigenous
peoples by Western nations has been the presence of a dominant culture or
monoculture.' In other words, the inability of the would be conquerors to
decipher the cultural code of a nation, oftentimes thwarted or, at least, slowed
down the process of conquest.' Early European expeditions in the Americas
were primarily military operations with economic objectives.38 Consequently,
there was a need for "intelligence-gathering" to assess the strengths and
weaknesses of native civilizations.39 Likewise, by unlocking the codes to the
monoculture that developed in Mesoamerica, one is able to better understand
the vulnerabilities of the world that emerged from the chaos of prehispanic
Mexico. These weaknesses were deeply ingrained within the structure and

36. The presence of a dominant culture (Aztec) with a centralized government in
Mesoamerica enabled Cortds to subdue and conquer the Triple Alliance in less than two years
of his arrival in the capital of Tenochtitlan. See FAGAN, supra note 2, at 261-77. But see
MICHAEL E. SMITH & FRANCES E. BERDAN, Introduction to AzTEC IMPERIAL STRATEGIES 4
(Frances E. Berdan, et aL., 1996). Smith and Berdan explain that the people known as the
"Aztecs" were comprised of Nahuatl speakers from diverse polities and ethnic groups loosely
aligned with the Triple Alliance. The Aztecs were actually the inhabitants of the Valley of

Mexico at the center or core of the empire. See id.
37. Hemdn Cortds was aided in his efforts by a marooned Spaniard, Jeronimo de Aguilar,
who had lived among the Maya for eight years and learned their language. He was also assisted
by disgruntled provincial leaders who gave him insight into the structure of the Triple Alliance.
Perhaps his most valuable cultural interpreter was Marina (or Malinche), an Indian woman who
became his concubine and common-law wife. See generally FAGAN, supra note 2, at 261-27.
38. See FRANK, supra note 13, at 1-7; see also FAGAN, supra note 2, at 261-77.
39. See FAGAN, supra note 2, at 261-77.
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character of the monoculture that spread throughout Mesoamerica and, like a
Greek hubris, sowed the seeds of its destruction.
A. The Development of a Monoculture in Mesoamerica
1. Stages-of-Development Analysis
To understand the contemporary problems of land ownership and
distribution in Mexico, one must start at the beginning, with the origins of the
culture. Since culture is the essence or sum total of the elements which bind
individuals to a particular group or social unit, the social development of the
native inhabitants of prehispanic Mexico is relevant to this discourse.
The use of historical models to explain social change often contradicts the
empirical evidence of historical reality.4' This is particularly true of historical
models which utilize the concept of stages.' The concept itself is derived
from the attempts of theorists to deal with social transformations over a long
historical time 3 The long term is divided into segments in order to observe
the structural changes from specific points in time." These segments
represent "stages" in the "development" of a social structure." As its name
suggests, a stages-of-development model is decidedly Western in orientation;
that is to say, it operates on the premise that human social development
occurs in linear stages. Malinowski uses a stages-of-development model to
explain the evolution of human organization beginning with the smallest social
unit, the family, and progressing to the stage of tribe-states and the penultimate, tribe nation-state, which is identifiable by the presence of distinct
cultural markers. 4

40. The subjugated tribes within the monoculture continually rebelled against the repression
of the dominant tribe.
[Tjhe fact of conquest was a logical consequence of the Aztec structure. The
Aztec empire was never a territorially integrated system that could stand in
opposition to an outside threat.... [The) endemic revolts show a certain amount
of continual hostility, so the appearance of Cortes, rather than being simply a new
and opposing force of equal organization, was instead a small wedge driven into
a nonintegrated empire, splitting along the cleavages inherent in its structure.
HAssIG, supra note 20, at 150.
41. See Immanuel Wallerstein, The Rise and FutureDemise of the World CapitalistSystem:
Concept- for Comparative Analysis, in INTRODUCTION TO THE SOCIOLOGY OF "DEVELOPING
SocIEIs" 29 (Hanza Alavi & Teodor Shanin eds., 1982).
42. See id. at 29.
43. See Wallerstein, supra note 41, at 30.
44. See id. at l, 44.

45. See id.
46. See BRONISLAW MALINOWSKI,

FREEDOM AND CIVILIZATION 255 (1944). Malinowski
treats the concepts of tribe-state/tribe-nation as prototypes of the modem city-state/nation-state.
See id.
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Tribe-nations are defined as an amalgamation of the largest number of
social groups sharing a common culture' Bound by common customs,
traditions, language and religion, tribe-nations are formed by homogenous
social groups. Individual membership in a tribe-nation is maintained and
reinforced through socialization; to wit, primary social institutions such as
kinship clans, warrior societies, and religious orders fuse the individual's
identity with that of his group culture. This bonding process is made easier
because the cultivation of culture is a function of these same institutions. The
development of social mechanisms for cultivating and transmitting culture is
one of the markers of a tribe-nation"
Individual group members are continually adapting to changes in the
cultural landscape, or, if you will, altering their concept of an external
"cultural self." This expression of individuality creates social tension that is
always pulling at the threads of group cultural cohesion. One of the
fundamental attributes of an enduring or living culture, however, is that it
does change. It is, in fact, always undergoing change. "What lasts, or anyway
has for a long time lasted, is not what it is these [nations] are. They are still
terrains on which ambitions cross. What lasts is what it is they are up against:
'
diversity, dispersion, and the enormous tenacity of immediate allegiance."49
Maintaining political unity or cohesion, as opposed to cultural unity, is a
function of tribe-states which historically have used physical force to retain
power and control over groups within their territorial boundaries.' The
concentration of power in a centralized authority and the corresponding
organization of armed force is the distinguishing characteristic of tribestates."I The tribe-nation and tribe-state are interdependent to the extent that
the political agenda of the latter furthers the cultural objectives of the
former.' The inculcation of culture through the exercise of political authority
is possible because the day-to-day mechanism of "politics" involves many of
the same institutions associated with culture transference: religion, education,
law, and family.
The use of scientific methodology to decipher the mysteries of a culture
has its limitations. Foremost among these limitations is its reliance on
objective criteria to explain the human chaos that is culture. Another way of
looking at scientific methodology is to see it as a screening process that filters
out knowledge bases which do not comport with Western thinking. This
filtering process prevents researchers who use Western modes of analysis

47. See id at 253.

48. See id. at 257.
49. CHARLES GEER7Z, AFrER THE FACT 29, 30 (1995).
50. See MAUNOWSKI, supra note 46,at 258.
51. See id.
52. See id ("[W]hen the political control extends to the boundaries of the cultural unit, the
tribe-state and the tribe-nation coincide and form a primitive tribal nation-state."); see id. at 261.

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 1999

AMERICAN INDIAN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 23

from acquiring an intimate knowledge of a culture. Intimate knowledge, in
this context, refers to a level of deep understanding that requires the
researcher to use his subjective mind to experience the "resident suchness" of
a culture. Renowned cultural anthropologist Charles Geertz coined the term
"resident suchness" as a metaphor for the chakra or "spirit" of a living
culture - the source of its power.'
Using a research model based on linear progression or stages of development to explain the evolution of non-Western societies has other limitations
as well.M Progress is defined in Western terms, therefore, societies whose
development does not follow a pattern of linear progression are falsely labeled
as "backward" or "primitive." The devaluation of cultures in this manner
perpetuates a Western view of world that does not correlate to reality. A more
basic problem with studying the social development of a civilization from a
posteriori prospective is the opportunity it creates for historical revision; that
is to say, the researcher brings to his studies a myriad of personal biases that
invariably alter or distort the lived reality no matter what analytical model is
used.
In spite of these limitations, stages-of-development is an appropriate model
for analyzing the evolution of a prehispanic monoculture. This is true
particularly because historical evidence suggests Mesoamerican culture
evolved linearly, so that a stages-of-development analysis is not incompatible
with its natural pattern of development.55 The existence of developmental
similarities between the dominant cultures in Mesoamerica and Europe,
however, does not mean the cultures evolved in an identical manner. There
is a certain element of chance in a culture's pattern and rate of growth which
makes it highly unlikely that civilizations reaching similar stages of development awrived there through an identical course of events.
Finally, an analysis of the social development of culture in Mesoamerica
must include an examination of the contributions these indigenous cultures
made to the emerging world economic system.' Unfortunately, the genius

53. GEtrrz, supra note 49, at 23 (referencing inner cultural values).
54. See JAMEs ANAYA, INDIGENOUS PEOPLES ININTERNATIONAL LAw 16 (1996) (stating that

even the broad definition of nation and state, as envisaged by the early international law theorist,
Vattel, is conditioned by a basic prejudice favoring the values behind European political and
social organization).
55. See id. (stating that the civilizations of the Incas of Peru and the Aztecs of Mexico were
considered to have evolved in a Western manner because of the strong similarities in their social
structure).
56. Precapitalist annexation of foreign territories by stronger powers left the economies of
the subjugated intact. These relationships changed under capitalism.

[Tihe roughly five centuries of conquest and domination that began at the end of
the fifteenth century was distinguished by the extent to which the conquerors
imposed social and economic changes on their victims and the degree to which the
latter became appendages of the economies at the core of the empire.
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of indigenous economies was neither fully appreciated nor understood by the
Western European nations, the core members of this fledgling world economic
system. Imperialism and greed would destroy the native economy in
Mesoamerica; the flourishing civilization would decline in the shadow of

world capitalism.
2. The Contributionof the Teotihuacan and Tolteca
Sixteenth-century Mesoamerica witnessed the rise and fall of two great
indigenous cultures, the Teotihuacan and the Tolteca.' These civilizations
began as simple agricultural societies organized as economic minisystems and

evolved into tribe nation-states with elaborate redistributive economies' The
consolidation of tribe-states - who shared common cultural, sociological, and

ethnic characteristics under an indigenous theocracy and a centralized political
authority - led to the creation of tribe nations." The subsequent extension
of political authority to the limits of the cultural borders of the tribe-states
gave rise to tribe nation-states.' This process was made easier because of

the redistributive mode of production. Redistribution, broken down to its most
basic elements, is a mechanism for expanding political authority through trade

and cultural unification through economic interdependence. 6'
The forces that converge to move a society toward a redistributive

economy are often, like other pivotal steps in human development, products
of necessity. In the case of the Teotihuacans* and Tolteca, the urbanization
of centralized or core cities led to the restructuring of relationships with

Harry Magdoff, Imperialism: A Historical Survey, in INTRODUCrION TO THE SOCIOLOGY OF
"DEVELOPING SOCIETES" II (Hamza Alavi & Teodor Shanin eds., 1982).
57. Teotihuacan, at its zenith in the fifth century, is believed to have been home to as many
as 90,000 inhabitants. See generally MORELOS VIENTE EN LA CIMA, FUEGO EN EL CANAVERAL,
MONOGRAFIA ESTATAL, SECRETARIA DE EDUCCACION PUBLICA [MORELOS WIND IN THE SUMMIT,
FIRE IN THE SUGAR CANE FIELD, ESTATAL MONOGRAPH, SECRETARY OF PUBLIC EDUCATION]

40 (1992) [hereinafter MORELOS].
58. See FAGAN, supra note 2, at 27-42.
A minisystem is an entity that has within it a complete division of labor and a
single cultural framework... any such system that became tied to an empire by
the pavement of tribute as "protection costs" ceased by that fact to be a "system,"
no longer having a self-contained division of labor . . . for such an area, the
payment of tribute marked a shift . . . from being a reciprocal economy to
participating in a larger redistributive economy ....
Wallerstein, supra note 41, at 31.
59. Anaya points out that the terms "nation" and "state," which are used interchangeably by
Vattel in his seminal work Law of Nations, are Western concepts. ANAYA, supra note 54, at 16
("[concepts which] developed as a reference to the post-Westphalian political community and
attendant bureaucracy, whose dominant organizing characteristic was territory").
60. See MALINOWSKI, supra note 46, at 258.
61. See id. at 31.
62. See generally HASSIG, supra note 20, at 3-8 (speaking about general theories of
urbanization as they relate to development of a basic market system precolumbian Mesoamerica).
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neighboring tribes in outlying regions.' The systematic supply of necessities
to dominant tribe states, which were not states in modem terms but rather
highly populated city-states, was the impetus behind the realignment of
political relationships. Thus, the use of tribute payments, in the form of crop
staples, to augment regular food production was essential to the growth and
stability of these tribe states.'
In order to expand or diversify the redistribution network, the tribe-state
had to subdue weaker tribes whose tribute payments added value to the
existing network.' Campaigns of conquests, in essence, achieved economic
stability through political force. As these campaigns extended beyond the
traditional boundaries of the tribe-states, political influence in an entire region
became consolidated under a central govemment. This development set the
stage for progression to the tribe nation-state phase.
The process of coalescing into a tribe nation-state involved the transference
of values and norms from one group to the other, usually from the dominant
to the subordinate group, and the subsequent transfiguration of both groups
into a new cultural paradigm. Once subjugated groups were integrated into the
redistributive network, they began to engage in local and regional commerce
with other vassals of the tribe city-state and later the tribe nation-state.'
Transmittal of cultural values and norms in the marketplace was a natural
phenomenon. Markets were hubs of activity where groups from various
regions and sectors of the emerging tribe nation-state congregated and
socialized. Thus, trade was not only an instrument of commerce it was an
important medium of cultural exchange.
By the beginning of the ninth century, a distinctive monoculture had
emerged in Mesoamerica. It was a culture derived from the two prominent
tribes, the Teotihuacan and Tolteca, with variations reflecting regional
differences.' Nowhere was the influence of the Teotihuacan and Tolteca
cultures more evident than in the area of religion. Although the theocratic
structure of the Teotihuacan and Tolteca governments was rejected by
succeeding generations, the basic tenets of their religion survived.'

63. See generallyid. at 5 (discussing the impact of urbanization upon the social relationships
and civil structure of precolumbian city-states in Mesoamerica).

64. See generally id. at 5-6 (describing the dynamics of the economic symbiosis between
urban and rural population centers).
65. See generally Frances F. Berdan, The Tributary Provinces, in AzTEC IMPERIAL
STRATEmIEs 120 (Frances F. Berdan et al. eds., 1996) (reviewing the historical patterns of empire
building in precolumbian Mesoamerica).
66. See id. at 120-21.
67. Some historians argue that Teotihuacan was organized as a strong centralized state
government because of its agricultural-tribute mode of production. See MORELOS, supra note 57,
at 40.
68. See id. at 42-43.
69. See id. at 40-44.
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The perpetuation of one component of a dominant culture and the
elimination of another is part of the process of group selection. In the case
of religion, a major social institution, the establishment of a tribe nation-state
invariably includes the transmittal of religious values. As noted previously,
the religious views of the dominant group often replace those of the
subordinate group. There is, however, an element of randomness associated
with the formation of culture. In other words, those cultural ideas which
flourish, that become integrated into the collective consciousness of a group,
are, in the final analysis, an expression of free will. In this context, free will
is the selection of the most desirable traits of a culture for transmittal to future
generations. The religious ideology and traditions of th6 Teotihuacan and
Tolteca survived because they embodied the magic and mythology most true
to the native belief system of the widest spectrum of indigenous groups."
The religious component of this monoculture was instrumental in the
development and organization of the mexica or azteca society.
The demise of the last great prehispanic civilization in Mesoamerica
brought with it significant changes in the structure and focus of the indigenous
religion. The change was precipitated by a radical shift in the religious
orientation of the Tolteca, the dominant clan within a tribe known as the
Tollan or Tula.7 The Tula rule was characterized by a cultural dynamism
expressed through the arts, architecture, agriculture, and metaphysics. Their
core values and basic orientation was that of aesthetic. In the religious realm,
reverence for beauty was reflected in the sacrifice of flowers, butterflies and
jade objects in ritual offerings made to their principal god, Quetzalcoatl (the
feathered serpent). These traditional sacrificial offerings were supplanted by
human sacrifice with the advent of an age of militarism.' The period of
militarism that began with the Tulas would end with the Spanish conquest of
the Triple Alliance also known as the Aztec empire.'

70. The role of "magic" is essential to group cohesiveness.
[Magic] in its very essence is the belief that man, by virtue of his tribal lore,
traditional spells and ritual gestures, can conquer accident and overcome disaster
through the assertion of his mystically founded power, and thus secure success in
human enterprise .... Magic brings about the spiritual mobilization of all

values ....
MALINOWSKI, supra note 46, at 245.
71. See MORELOS, supra note 57, at 43.
72. One legend attributes the fall of the Tula to treachery perpetrated by rival sarcedotes,
worshipers of Tezcatlipoca, the God of Wind. According to this legend, a beautiful malden who
induced the leader of the Tulas to drink "pulque," a drink made from the maguey cactus. The
leader, who was a sarcedote of Quetzalcoatl became, and his allies became intoxicated. In this
weakened state, his enemies aided by the sarcedotes of TezcatIlipoca, ousted his government.
Human sacrifice allegedly began under the regime of the sarcedotes of Tezcatlipoca. See id. at

44.
73. See

FAGAN,

supra note 2, at 41, 49-73.
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The religious expression of this militarism, the ritual sacrifice of humans,
was viewed by the Spanish Conquistadors as evidence of the barbarism of the
Indian population.74 Barbarians were infidels under Catholic doctrine.
Consequently, the ferocity and brutality of the repression of the native
population by Spanish conquistadors assumed the characteristics of a holy
war; a systematic purging of heretics. In the end, the bloodletting which
followed in the wake of the Spanish conquest of Mexico would rival that shed
by the Aztec through decades of warring and religious human sacrifice.76
B. The Social Organizationof the Aztecs
1. CulturalRenewal and Revitalization
After the disintegration of the Tula empire, there was no longer a dominant
group with enough political force to unite weaker tribe-states into a single
nation. The period that followed was marked by continuous warring among
the tribe-states.' During this tumultuous time, culture flourished episodically
but was. extinguished by the wages of war. Although some would call this
period a "dark age," it was in fact a period of cultural dormancy78 - a
period of internal strife created not only by political instability but by the lack
of a unifying nation suprastructure. Even in the absence of a visible cultural
link or continuum, the influence of the earlier monoculture was present in the
language, religion, customs, and traditions of the groups who succeeded the
Tulas. These cultural building blocks formed the foundation for the next tribe
nation-state.9
The Mexicas, Tenochas, or Aztecas arrived in the valley of Mexico around
the eleventh century from a place they called Aztlan.m In 1325 the Aztecs
founded a city called Tenochtitlan at a site where, as it had been prophesied,
they observed an eagle perched on a napal cactus." Mexico City now stands
over this site. Under the leadership of Izcoatl, the Tenochtitlan united with
Texcoco and Tlacopan to defeat a common enemy, the Tepanecas (Tacuba).
The success of this mutual assistance arrangement was the beginning of the
Confederation of Anahuac also known as the Triple Alliance.n The con-

74. See id. at 273.
75. See generally id. at 279-84 (speaking about the impact of the culture and value clash
between the Spanish conquerors and Indian natives).

76. See ki.
77. See MORELOS, supra note 57, at 45-47.
78. "A serious breakdown in the economic, political or legal order, which usually also
implies dterioration in the systems of knowledge and ethics, leads human groups to disorganization and to the sinking of the cultural level." MAUINOVISKI, supra note 46, at 256.
79. See FAGAN, supra note 2,at 44-47.
80. See id. at 50-51. "Aztlan" in nahuatl means tierra de garza, or "land of the heron." Id,
81. See id. at 48. "Tenochtitlan" in nahuatl means "place of the fruit of the prickly pear

cactus." Id.
82. See id. at 60-63.
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solidation of power in the Triple Alliance provided the framework for the
unification of the weaker tribes into a new tribe nation-state.' Although the
three allies were politically independent, power was not equally distributed
among the three. The Mixeca, or Aztecs, were the dominant group.'
The Aztecs were not cultural innovators like the Teotihuacan and Tolteca.
They were warriors who built an empire on the foundation created by their
powerful predecessors.' Since many of the basic cultural institutions were
already in place, having been inherited from the Teotihuacan and Tolteca, the
Aztecs can be credited with the renewal and revitalization of the dormant
tribe-nation culture.' The rebirth of the tribe-nation under the militaristic
regime of the Triple Alliance, an organizing political mechanism, gave rise
to the Aztec empire or Aztec tribe nation-state. 7
This last, great indigenous civilization was organized initially as an
oligarchy but evolved into an elective absolute monarchy. 8 The king, or
huey tlatoani, which means "great king," was elected by the Aztec nobility
through indirect election.' Candidates for huey tlatoani were drawn from the
eligible pool of males in the royal family who possessed the following
attributes: mature (at least thirty years old), brave, just, temperate, and
educated at the Calmecac. Five royal advisors, four regular and one senior
advisor, were elected simultaneously with the huey tlatoani. These advisors
served the huey tlatoani throughout his reign.91
The militaristic nature of the Triple Alliance facilitated the development of
a well-extended indigenous redistributive economy. Conquered tribes were
required to pay tribute to the Alliance in the form of goods, arms, and
soldiers.' The Aztec no doubt created a stronger and more diversified
economy because of their effective war machinery. The resulting
redistribution network would have encompassed most of Mexico because of
the breadth of Aztec political authority. The military expansionism under the
Alliance also enabled the Aztecs to satisfy religious demands for human

83. See iL
84. See id.
85. See Frances F. Berdan & Michael E. Smith, Imperial Strategies and Core-Periphery

Relations, in AzTEC IMPERIAL STRATEGIES 209-17 (Frances Berdan et al. eds., 1996).
86. See id,
87. See id.
88. See Francisco Avalos, An Overview of the Legal System of the Aztec Empire, 86 LAw
LIBR. J. 260 (1994).
89. L. MENDIETA Y NUNEZ, EL DERECHO PRECOLONIAL [THE PRE-COLONIAL LAW] 36
(1937) [hereinafter EL DERECHO].
90. See id at 38. Calmecac was a school for the males of Aztec nobility. All males were
sent to the school from age 15 to 22. Thereafter they served the King in various capacities but
usually militarily. If a young male was selected as emperor, a regent was elected to rule until the
King came of age. See Avalos, supra note 88, at 261.
91. See EL DERECHO, supranote 89, at 39,
92. See id. at 13.
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sacrifices!' Prisoners of war were sacrificed to their Sun God, Huitzilopochtli.'
The renewal of the tribe nation-state under the Aztec rule did not end the
underlying group animus and tensions." The revitalization of the common
cultural heritage was a means to an end; to wit, the creation of a national
identity. But underneath this facade subjugated groups clung to their ethnic
differences and chafed under Aztec rule. These divisions later would be
skillfully exploited by Hemn Cortds."
2. Division of Property
All land in the Triple Alliance was the property of the huey tlatoani. The
division of interests and assignment of rights in property were determined by
the huey tlatoani.' In speaking of private property it is important to
distinguish between the concept of property ownership found in Aztec society
and Western societies. 98
The ownership of land was valued in Aztec society because of the status
associated with being a property holder. The Aztecs believed land was a gift
from the gods; therefore, owning land carried with it special duties.' Only
certain classes of individuals could own land: members of the nobility and
warriors of distinction. The other property holders were institutions and
"barrios" or communal collectives.'" The land owner received enhanced
social status and some but not all of the economic benefits derived from land.
The land itself remained a community asset. Private property holders, in fact,
had limited control over the productive uses of the land. Only the huey
tlatoan! had absolute authority to use the land as he choose.'
The Aztec leadership, called the tiatoque (singular: el tlatoani), considered
the maintenance of social order a key to state strength and unity.'" In such
a militaristic society individual members are conditioned to sublimate personal
interests for the good of the collective; nonconformity carried a high price.

93. See MORELOS, supra note 57, at 49. The primary Aztec god Huitzilopochtli (also
known as colibrizurdo, or "left handed hummingbird") represented the sun. The Aztecs believed
human hearts sacrificed to this deity maintained the cosmic balance. See id.
94. In some instances the prisoner of war would be made to fight Aztec warriors for his
life.
If the prisoner was victorious, he would be spared. See Avalos, supra note 88, at 275.
95. See generally Berdan, supra note 65, at 115-35 (discussing the dual economic and
political function of the Aztec tributary provinces).
96. See FAGAN, supra note 2, at 269.
97. See Avalos, supra note 88, at 272.
98. See EL DERECHO, supra note 89, at 39.
99. See FAGAN, supra note 2, at 283.

100. See Avalos, supra note 88, at 273.
101. See id. at 272.
102. See id.
at 270; see also Fernando Flores Garcia, La Administrationde Justicla en los
Pueblos Aborigenes de Anahuac, 15 REvIsTA DE LA FACULTAD DE DERECHO DE MExico 86
(1965).
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The attitude of the Aztecs toward social deviance is most evident in their legal
system where even crimes of moral turpitude, such as theft, official graft, and
adultery, were capital offenses. 3 Nobility and military leaders were held to
an even higher standard of conduct. "Their behavior was expected to be
exemplary to serve as an example for the masses, and, thus, their offenses
were more severely punished.""l°s Since most land was held by the highestranking members of Aztec society, they would have strictly adhered to the
social mores of land ownership.
Further evidence of the communal value of property in Aztec society is
found in their social structure. The Aztecs used a specialized vocabulary to
denote land classifications in their society. The terminology used by the
Aztecs to differentiate between land classes, however, should not be construed
as evidence of underlying precepts of property that conform to Western
notions of land tenure. This is not the case. These terms are only descriptive
and refer to the qualities of the land or its uses.
The basic social unit was the calpulli (plural: calpultin) which constituted
both a territorial and family structure. Calpulli means "big house," and it was
the primary family residence. The entire nuclear family and many of their
relatives lived in the calpulli. The Aztecs were a patrilineal society so every
calpulli member had a kinship bond (real or mythical) with the father.
These kinship bonds were like blood ties, so male members were prohibited
from marrying women within their own calpulli.' The fact that incest was
considered to be a capital offense doubtlessly reinforced the social taboo of
inter-calpulli marriage."

Each calpulliwas assigned a parcel of land (also called calpulli)which was
the common property of the family. The capulin lands were carved from
larger parcels, the altepetlalli, owned by the pueblos or towns. Individual
families were given an inheritable, usufruct interest in their calpulli parcel.'"
If, however, the parcel of land was untilled for a period more than two years,
the calpulli returned it to the calpullec who reassigned it to another
family. " The calpullec, a local level public office, was responsible for the
organization and distribution of the capulin lands."' The officers of the
calpullecs were elected by the barrios or neighborhoods."'
There were two classes of land granted by the huey tlatoani to nobles and
warriors in gratitude for the services they rendered: the pillalli and the

103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
Ill.

See Avalos, supra note 88, at 270.
Il
See MORELOS, supranote 57, at 53.
See id.
See Avalos, supra note 88, at 270.
See BARTRA, supra note 27, at 106.
See id.
See MORELOS, supra note 57, at 53.
See Avalos, supra note 88, at 273.
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tecpillalli,private estates similar to feudal fiefs."' The tecpillalli lands were
granted to nobles and functionaries called tectecuhtzin.'" These lands were
essentially life estates given to the tectecuhtzin as remuneration. The
tectecuhtzin were given temporary grants to collect and keep all the tributes
owed to the state by designated communities."' The people who worked on
tecpillalli lands were called the tecallec. They had the same inheritable
usufruct interest in the land as the calpulli."5 The pillalli lands were
established through royal concessions made by the huey tiatoani for the
benefit of the pipiltin, the sons and daughters of nobles."' These lands
usually had restrictions on them regarding the owner's right of alienation and
inheritance." 7 The laborers who worked on the pillalli, the mayeques, had
no interest in the land. The mayeques were completely dependent on the land
and were, in fact, sold or inherited in conjunction with it."' They paid
tribute to a pilli (noble), not the huey tlatoani." The precarious, landless
status of the mayeques relegated them to the periphery of the calpull.' 2"
Land set aside for the personal maintenance of the huey tlatoani was called
the tlatocalalli.' The mitlchimalli were lands allocated for the maintenance
of the military, whereas the teotlalpan were lands designated for the
maintenance of the temples.' " There were two types of land owned by the
barrio, ihe calpulli and the calpullalli. The former type of land, as previously
noted, referred to the parcels of land distributed to individual families but
owned communally; the latter denoted lands owned and cultivated communally." Of the two types of barrio land, the calpullalli were the most vital to
the Aztec empire. The proceeds from these lands were used to pay the
barrio's tribute obligations and taxes."z All of the aforementioned forms of
property were consistent with a redistributive or tribute based mode of
production."
When the conquistadors arrived in Mexico, they encountered a flourishing
culture and prosperous people."z This was due, in large part, to the genius
of the Aztec imperial structure, particularly its trade and tribute network. The

112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
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119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
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See
See
See
See
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See
See

BARTRA, supra note 27,at 106.
id at 107.
id.
id.
FAGAN, supra note 2,at170-71.
BARTRA,supra note 27,at107.
id.
FAGAN, supra note 2,at176-77.
id.
BARTRA,supra note 27,at 107.
id.
Avalos, supra note 88, at 273.
id.
BARTRA, supra note 27,at 107.
FAGAN,supra note 2,at 113.
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Spanish Crown would try in vain to maintain and perpetuate this system
without ever discovering the secret to its success: the calpulli and calpullalli,
the communal lands.'2
III. The Colonial Epoch: The Spanish Experiment
The origins of the monopolistic land tenure system in Mexico can be traced
to the hybrid culture that flourished in the aftermath of the Spanish conquest.
The systematic dismantling of the native culture by the twin powers, the
Spanish Monarchy and the Catholic Church, left only the European colonial
culture intact." Yet the Spanish culture transplanted to Mexico was
different than the one in the motherland. Perverted by a myriad of internal
and external pressures, the colonial culture became despotic.' New Spain,
as Mexico was called by the Spaniards, proved to be an inhospitable place for
its nonwhite inhabitants which included not only Indians but Africans
imported to work in the sugar cane fields."' Racism was an integral part of
the Spanish strategy for the colonization of Mexico. The Spanish made a
clear distinction between the economic value derived from the native labor
and resources of Mexico and the questionable value of the Indian people, in
particular, and their culture, in general. The Indian population was considered
barbaric by European standards, and the Crown found the idea of ruling over
such uncivilized peoples repugnant. The dilemma, from the perspective of the
Monarchy and Catholic Church, was how to siphon-off the surplus of the
Indian and colonial economies, which required preservation of the native
culture, while making over the Indian in the image of his Spanish conqueror,
which meant "civilizing" the natives.' The twin powers initiated a dual
policy of racial separation, to protect Spain's economic interest in the Indian
"Europeanization" of the Indians, in keeping with the church's
population, and
32
social agenda.

Greed was a dominant cultural trait of Spanish colonial society.' The
colonists of New Spain were preoccupied with amassing wealth because it led
to the object of their desire, higher social status. Since much of the aggregate
wealth of Mexico was sent to Spain, the colonial economy was heavily
dependent upon the European market for its stability.'"4 Spain's economic

127. See BARTRA, supra note 27, at 107.
128. See FAGAN, supra note 2, at 279-80.

129. See id. at 279-96.
130. See generally MORELOS, supra note 57,at 83 (regarding the use of African slaves to
work in the sugar cane fields in Morelos, Mexico).
131. See generally BORAH, supra note 10, at 25-40 (discussing the various positions taken
by the Spanish with regard to the handling of the "Indian" question in New Spain).

132. See id. at 25-48.
133. See FAGAN, supra note 2, at 279-84.
134. See FRANK, supra note 13, at 8.
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decline at the end of the sixteenth century, however, led to a radical change
in the economic and social structure of Mexico. The economic depression in
Spain and Europe created opportunities for enterprising colonial capitalists,
who turned their attention to the expanding domestic market. 3 Agriculture
production, fueled by severe food shortages, made land a valuable commodity. 36 Thus, Indian lands and labor became the driving force behind the
revitalization of the colonial economy.'37 The resulting land dispossessions
and impoverishment of the Indian population was part of a genocidal cycle
that would claim millions of lives before it peaked.'
In the end, a
reconstituted colonial society, built around the wealth and power of a landed
elite, would arise from the economic ruins of Spain, nourished by the sweat
and blood of the Indians.
"BAJO EL SUELO DE MEXICO"
Bajo el suelo de Mexico verdean
espesamente putridas las aguas
que lavaron la sangre conquistada;
nuestra contradiccion:agua u
aceite,
permanece a la orilla dividiendo
como un segundo dios
todas las cosas:
lo que deseamos ser y lo que
somos ...
el temor de ser nadie y replegarse
a la noche perpetua en que los
dioses
se pudren bajo el lago y su
silencio ...
Below the ground of Mexico turning green
thickly putrefied waters
that washed the conquered blood.
Our contradiction:water and
oil.
It remains at the dividing edge
like a second god
all things:
that which we desire to be and that

135.
136.
137.
138.

See
See
See
See

id at 51-60.
id at 56-60.
id at 51-60.
FAGAN, supra note 2, at 285-88.
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which we are...
The fear of being nobody and to fall back
to the eternal night in which the
gods
rot beneath the lake and its
silence . . .'
A. Merging Mesoamerica into the World Economy
Northwestern Europe at the end of the fifteenth century was the center of
a redistributive empire. This redistribution took two forms: (1) the skimming
off by the Europeans of as much as possible of the accumulated surplus of the
rest of the world, and (2) the conflict among leading European nations Spain, Portugal, Holland, France and England - for access to the wealth of
other continents, including what they could pirate from each other on the high
seas.'" In this charged atmosphere, looting, plunder, and piracy were the
primary agents of redistribution and new concentrations of wealth.'4 "The
prize in distant commerce went not to the best producers and merchants, but
to the group of the best fighters; not size and resources, but ability to organize
and willingness to risk resources in conflict, determined the question of
success."'42 This was the period of world agricultural capitalism, and the
surplus coveted by these nations was primarily agricultural produce. 43
Profound changes in this system, however, were occurring. Mercantilism was
spreading across the European continent, stimulating international trade and
intensifying economic interdependence."
As Spain embarked on its
expansion into the Americas, the core nations of the agricultural capitalist
system were transitioning to mercantile capitalism.
The venture capital for Spain's exploratory forays into the Americas came
principally from the emerging Spanish mercantile class, not the monarchy. It
was the great Spanish merchants who provided much of the fihancial backing
for the expeditions.'" Despite the risky nature of these investments, the
success of earlier expeditions in the circum-Caribbean region had

139. Jose Emilio Pacheco, Bajo el suelo de Mexico [Below the Ground of Mexico], in EL

REPOSO DEL FUEGO [THE CALM OF THE FIRE] (n.d.).
140. See Magdoff, supra note 56, at 11, 14.
141. See id. at 14.
142. CLIvE DAY, A HISTORY OF COMMERCE 166 (1938).

143. See Wallerstein, supra note 41, at 38-39.
144. See BAGU, supra note 19, at 39, 68, 117, 260; see, e.g., FRANK, supra note 13, at 2.
145. See JOSE OTs CAPDEQUI, EL REGIMEN DE LA TIERRA EN LA AMERICA ESPANOLA
DURANTE EL PERIODO COLONIAL [THE LAND REGIME IN SPANISH AMERICA DURING THE

COLONIAL PERIOD], CUIDAD TRUJILLO, EDITORA MONTALvO 8-11 (1946). The legal interests of

expedition investors were memorialized in documents known as capitulaciones. The
capitulacioneswere not only legal documents but also negotiable instruments. See FRANK, supra
note 13, at 3.
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demonstrated to Spanish merchants that windfall profits awaited investors who
acquired control over the marketable production sources in the new territories.
Thus, the colonies became a byproduct of the developing mercantile capitalist
system." Conversely, colonial capitalism developed out of the efforts of
Spanish merchants to satisfy European market production demands.' "This
is how the trends which then predominated in European international markets
formed the principal elements shaping the colonial structure."'48
Colonial capitalism was divisive in comparison to the strategic economic
relationship of the Indian laborer tribute-producer and Indian lord tributeconsumer during the preconquest period.'49
The goal of the Indian noble was to consume wealth commensurate
with his social position. The Spanish colonist, however, labored for
different ends. He wanted to convert wealth and labor into salable
goods - into gold and silver, hides and wool, wheat and sugar
cane ...the motor of this capitalism was mining."

The images of untold "golden" treasures in exotic parts of the world was part
of the European lore of the sixteenth century. Such lore grew out of the
extensive travels of European merchants searching for new trading opportunities. These adventurers' tales sparked the imagination and fueled the greed
of conquerors who followed in their path. The quest for gold is what was
foremost in the minds of Hernn Cortds and his fellow conquistadors as they
looked out from their ships at the lush coastline of Veracruz, Mexico.' The
success of Spanish commercial ventures, including gold mining, in Mexico,
however, was contingent on Spain's ability to control and manage the
indigenous population."
The strategy of the Spanish Crown was not to destroy the Indian
production but to graft their own economy onto the existing indigenous one
and merely skim the cream off the top of the latter for the benefit of the
former.' The surplus value traditionally paid to the Indian nobility in the
form of tribute was given instead to a new set of privileged elite: kings,
conquerors, friars, merchants, and administrators." Although this despotic-

146.
147.
148.
149.
150.

See FRANK, supra note 13, at 2.
See i&
Id. at 2 (quoting BAGU, supra note 19).
See ERIC WOLF, SONS OF THE SHAKING EARTH 179 (1959).
Id.

151. See FRANK, supranote 13, at 2 (commenting that Cortds allegedly said, "The Spaniards
are troubled with a disease of the heart for which gold is the specific remedy.").
152. See WOLF, supra note 149, at 195 ("The conquerors wanted Indian labor, the crown
Indian subjects and the friars Indian souls.").

153. See CHARLES GIBSON, THE AZTEcS UNDER SPANISH RULE 335, 360 (1964).
154. See 4 MIGUEL OTHLON DE MENDIZABAL, OBRAS COMPLETAS 59 (Talleres Graficos de
la Nacion eds., 1945-46).
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tribute mode of production had succeeded in other places (China and India),
it would ultimately fail in Mexico. 5 Quite simply put,
[t]he participation of the Spanish colonists in this world system
generated objective needs, the pursuit of which necessarily drew
the entire Indian population and its economy into the system as
well. It became increasingly impossible to leave the Indian
economy and agriculture undisturbed and merely to scoop off
tribute.'The purpose of Spanish despotic-tribute was capital accumulation. Tribute
payments made in conjunction with this production mode did not strengthen
the native economy because a disproportionate amount of the value was
transferred to the European economy." As the tributary net for Indians
grew finer and finer, larger numbers of Indians, traditionally exempt from
such payments by virtue of their status, became obligated to pay the Spanish
tribute.5 The communal land distribution structure was disrupted and
eventually collapsed under the weight of the tribute burden the Spanish placed
on the indigenous populations.'"
In addition, the Crown modified the indigenous land distribution network
to conform to its purposes."6 The most valuable lands were appropriated by
the Spanish colonists. Lands belonging to the Indian nobility, the pillalliand
tecpillalli, 'fuie seriamente afectada y poco y poca fue pasando a manos de
los espanoles [were seriously affected and little by little were passing to the
hands of the Spanish].'' In an effort to preserve some of the indigenous
communal lands, the Crown decreed that approximately 600 varas (a measure
of about thirty-three inches) of land, measured from each new church toward
the four cardinal points, were set aside for newly founded Indian villages.
These lands was called fundo real." Indians were also given parcels of land

155. See FRANK, supra note 13, at 5-6. Frank points out that the capitalist tribute differs
from tribute in other modes of production in that its extraction and its use for the development
of one part of the system necessarily generates the underdevelopment of another part of the
system. The underdeveloped part of the mercantile capitalist system included most of Mexican

agriculture. See id.
156. Id.
157. See id. at 8. The proportion of services returned to the Indians from the Spanish in the

form of social services and public investments was less than under the Aztec rule. The Spanish
either invested this surplus in their own sector or shipped a good part of it to markets in Europe.

See id.
158.
159.
160.
161.

See id. at 9.
See id. at 8-36.
See id.
Id.
at 108.

162. See Jesus Romo Vejar & Lisa Weseman Larkin, Abating Migration of Mexico's Rural
Poor:A Legal, Practical,and Technical Examination, 5 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 105 (1988)
(explaining that some Indians who met the requirements of Christianity and loyalty to the Spanish
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the Spanish called the ejido.' This was a Spanish translation of an nahuatl

or Aztec term for a strip of land adjacent to the exit of a pueblo." 4 The
ejido became the functional equivalent of the altepetlalli." The land, which
was inalienable, was controlled by the consejo del pueblo, or town council ." Instead of the calpullalli and calpulli, the Spanish created the
proprios, a class of property that was worked in common, by rotation or
through lease arrangements. The produce from the proprio was used to

maintain the local government and pay taxes. 67

Lastly, the despotic-tribute system reified a feudal socioeconomic

relationship between the Spanish and Indians.'" The feudal nature of the
relationship between the Spanish and Indians was in keeping with the social

vision of the monarchy. The Crown wanted to create an Indian society
separated from the Spanish population and protected from its abuses by the

moral shield of noblesse oblige." The implementation of this social plan
was thwarted in part by the integration of the Mexican economy and its
agriculture into the expanding mercantile capitalist system.' Most significantly, the execution of policies under the plan led to the entrenchment of

racist group distinctions.'

The policy of separating the dark-skinned Indian

populations from the light-skinned European population stigmatized Indians
as the "other" that future generations of Mexicans would strive to be

disassociated from."

Crown were allowed to retain their lands, a practice called reducciones).
163. See BARTRA, supra note 27, at 108. The word ejido comes from the Latin exitus:
"exit." See id.
164. See Vejar & Larkin, supra note 162, at 112.
165. See BARTRA, supra note 27, at 108.
166. See id.
167. See id. at 109.
168. See id
169. See FRANK, supranote 13, at 5; see also BORAH, supra note 10, at 25-40.
170. See FRANK, supranote 13, at 6-7. Frank built on the periods of the history of Spanish
grain legislation completed in Enrique Florescano, ElAbasto y la legislacionde granes en el siglo
XVI [The Supply and the Legislation of Grains in the 16th Century], 16 HISTORIA MeXICANA
[MrA.cN HISTORY] 570 (1965). Florescano delineates three periods of Spanish economic
development. The first period (running to 1550), represents Spain's efforts to create a dual society
and dua economy. Id. at 604. The second period,(running to 1579), represents Spain's attempts
to overcome or mediate the difficulties created by its failed policies. See id. The last period
(1580-1595), represents Spain's total abandonment of these earlier policies and the substitution
of new ones which would lead to a full integration of the Mexican economy into the world
mercantile system. See id
171. See FAGAN, supranote 2, at 289-91.
172. See generally BORAH, supra note 10, at 401 (speaking about the impact that the
dismantling of the Indian Court in New Spain had on the status of Indians in Mexico: "the
indians ... future role as the lowest class in a common culture was delineated unmistakably").
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B. The Origin of the Latifundio
1. The Encomienda (1521-1548)
During the period immediately following the conquest of Mexico, Hernidn
Cortes and other military leaders and officials distributed land amongst
themselves and to others." The lands appropriated through this "self-help"
method were called encomiendas. Initially, the atrocities committed under the
encomienda system in the Spanish colony of Anchilles had caused many
officials, even Hernd.n Cort6s, to oppose its use in Mexico. 74 Cortds was
forced to modify his position, however, to maintain authority and control over
his troops. "[F]aced with the problem of organizing the conquest, providing
for military security, and rewarding companions in arms, he revised his
views."'75 Title to the soil was not automatically conferred to the possessor
of an encomienda.
[I]n New Spain property in the soil was not conveyed by granting
of an encomienda. Within the boundaries of a single encomienda
could be found lands held individually by the Indians; lands held
collectively by the villagers; crown lands; lands acquired by the
encomendero through a grant distinct from his title as encomendero or affected by his right to the payment of tribute in
agricultural products; and
lastly, lands granted to Spaniards other
76
than the encomendero.'

The growth of the encomiendas generated some political concern on the part
of the Monarchy, who did not want feudal-like estates flourishing in its new
territories.'"
In an effort to rein in the ambitions of the conquistadors, the Crown
appointed an archenemy of Cort6s to preside over an audienca, a judicial
body, to regulate the encomiendas.MThe first audienca was proceeded by
a second and sandwiched between both was the office of the corregimiento.' This office was charged with the dismantling and absorption of the
encomiendas within the royal system of government."w
173.
174.
175.
176.
(1943).
177.

See FRANK, supra note 13, at 10.
See MacLachlan, supra note 24, at 1-2, 14-18, 21-29, 31-33.
Id.
SILVIO ZAVALA, NEW VIEWPOINTS ON THE SPANISH COLONIZATION OF AMERICA 80-84
See FRANK, supra note 13, at 12 (quoting JOSE MIRANDA, LA FUNCION ECONOMICA DEL

ENCOMENDERO EN LOS ORIGENES DEL REGIMEN COLONIAL (NUEvA ESPANA 1525-1531)

[THE

ECONOMIC FUNCTION OF THE ENCOMENDERO IN THE ORIGINS OF THE COLONIAL REGIME (NEW

SPAIN 1525-1531)] at 10-34 (Mex. 1965)).
178. See MacLachlan, supra note 24, at 161. The audiencalater became the highest court
in the viceregal system. See id.
179. See id.
180. See id. The power struggle between the monarchy and the conquistadors at a basic level
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Despite the Monarchy's displeasure with Cort6s' decision to establish the
encomiendas, the estates did not have much economic significance to the
colonists because land had little or no value to them during this time.' 1 The
Spaniards were primarily interested in the Indian agricultural production for
supplies and in the Indian labor for the establishment and operation of Spanish
enterprises." The semi-feudal relationship that existed between. the encomendero and the encomienda Indians made it a natural source for native
labor. The Spanish colonists, not surprisingly, turned to the encomienda work
force to secure tributary payments made in the form of labor."'
Although the encomienda had the characteristics of a feudal estate, in
reality it operated more like a capitalist enterprise. The encomendero (the
master of the encomienda) was charged with the collection of tribute (which
was channeled to the mercantile capitalist system), similar to a feudal lord
but he was also free to carry on industrial and commercial activities."'
-

The encomendero is above all a man who has time, who is moved
by desire for profit and pursues the goal of wealth... For that
reason, he does not, like the feudal lord, limit himself to the mere
enjoyment of tribute and service; but he converts the one like the
other into the principal base of several business enterprises ....
He will do the same as any entrepreneur from that time till now;
use his own and others' resources and the work of others in the
pursuit of his own wealth and well-being.'"
Influenced by the success of the encomenderos, the Spanish Indian nobility
began to exact tribute labor from other Indians as they, too, began to invest
in the building of capital through capital enterprise."
By 1560, Mexico had approximately 480 encomenderos who had collected
a tribute of 377,734 pesos at a high price to the indigenous population."'
The majority of Indians were condemned to the bondage of slavery and
encomienda tribute labor." The cumulative effects of the dehumanizing

was about philosophical difference over the merits of centralized government versus a
decentralized one. See id.
181.

See FRANCOIS CHEVALIER, LAND AND SOCIETY IN COLONIAL MEXICO: THE GREAT

HACIENDA 55 (1970). The Crown viewed the encomenderos' power as a threat to its own still
weak authority in the Americas. See, e.g., MacLachlan, supra note 24, at 160-61.
182. See FRANK, supra note 13, at 10.
183. See id at 10-12.
184. See id. at 10.
185. JOSE MIRANDA, LA FUNCION ECONOMICA DEL ENCOMENDERO EN LOS ORIGENES DEL
REGIMEN COLONIAL [THE ECONOMIC FUNCTION OF THE ENDOMENDERO INTHE ORIGINS OF THE
COLONIAL REGIME] (NUEVA ESPANA F1525-1531), UNIVERSIDAD NACIONAL, AUTONOMA DE

MEXICO
186.
187.
188.

10-11, 33-34 (1965).
See WOLF, supra note 149, at 212-14.
See FRANK, supra note 13, at 13.
For the Indians, the only escape from tribute payment was through death or flight to
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work conditions and physical abuse to which Indian laborers were subjected,
in conjunction with a soaring mortality rate caused by the pandemic spread
of European diseases, caused a massive depopulation of native peoples.m
The lost of a significant portion of the Indian labor force strained the Mexican
colonial economy. The Spanish response to this crisis led to the development
of the institution of repartimiento'" and the transfer of responsibility for
tribute and tax collection to the office of the corregimiento;' these two
institutions began to replace the encomiendaas the mechanism for organizing
Indian labor and securing tribute."m
2. The Repartimiento (1548-1575)
The repartimiento was the beginning of the institutionalization of Indian
labor and the integration of this labor force into the mercantile capitalist
system. The repartimientogrew out the need for a more efficient system for
allocating Indian labor to meet the growing demands of the Spanish in the
face of a severe labor shortage.'93 The Mexican economy needed capital to
develop but the colonists themselves possessed none. Consequently, capital
was provided by the Indians in the form of land, labor, tribute, or taxes, and
through trading profit." The Spanish accumulation of capital through the
acquisition of land and labor was a major source of colonial economic growth;

the high lands. See id. at 14.
189. See id. at 13. Some experts estimate that by 1830 the Indian population in Mexico had
declined from 25,000,000 to 1,900,000. See also David Clark, Judicial Protection of the
Constitution in Latin America, 2 HASTINGs CONST. L.Q. 405-13 (1975).

190. See FRANK, supra note 13, at 15. Repartimientorefers to the Spanish system of drafting
Indian labor. See id.
191. See id. Corregimiento refers to the administration of the Spanish system of tribute
collection through taxation. See id.
192. Francisco Avalos, The Legal Personality of the ColonialPeriod of Mexico, 83 LAW
LIBR. J. 393 (1991).
By the Mid-Colonial Period of Mexico, the Crown had achieved centralized
control. In Mexico, the landed gentry has been weakened, mainly through the
death of the "Encomienda" system. The Church was also under control of the
Crown. Centralized control was further enhanced by what Ots y Capdequi
described as a balance and counter-balance technique, in which one institution
would be played against another. Lines of authority were never clearly defined,
and new offices were constantly being created in an effort to prevent any one
institution from becoming too powerful. The offices of Viceroy and Royal
Audiencia are examples of one institution being played against another, of
jurisdictions not being clearly defined, and of bureaucratic overlapping. The
desired effect was achieved by the Crown, but a huge and cumbersome
bureaucracy was created. By the time of the Independence movement, Mexico had
in place a bureaucratic monster that is still being tamed today.
Id. at 396.
193. See FRANK, supra note 13, at 24.
194. See id. at 21.
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labor, however, was the most important source.' The repartimiento was a
system. of forced wage labor that was rationed, on a rotational basis, to
Spanish employers in the public and private sectors.' The jueces repartidores (repartimientojudges) were responsible for allocating this labor.'
For the first thirty years of repartimiento, only 1% to 2% of the Indian
working population was pressed into service.' 8 This meant that about 6.3%
of the annual working time of the Indians was allocated to repartimiento
projects.'" The percentage of Indian labors allocated to the repartimiento
increa;ed by the viceroy to 5% to 8% by the end of the sixteenth century.2"
The expansion of the Spanish economy meant Indian tribute was taken
over by the civil government, specifically by the office of the corregimiento." Over time, tribute had progressed from being a device for the
generation of capital by a privileged Spanish class, to being a revenue
generating device for the political state.' The greater involvement of the
colonial state in this arena, however, did not end the exploitation or abuse of
Indians. The men charged with collecting the tribute and taxes from the
Indian communities, both encomienda and non-encomienda, were called
corregidores.'"The corregidores maintained a direct relationship with the
Indians which gave them a distinct commercial advantage. They were able to
manipulate and control the Mexican market by controlling the Indian
producer. ' In addition to overseeing the conveyance of tributes to the
colonial treasury officers, the enterprising corregidores operated a thriving
black-market in Indian produced commodities.2 Graft, too, became a major
problem among the corregidores, who demanded extra or unauthorized
tributes called derrama from the Indians. 6
The corruptive hold of middlemen, like the corregidores, over Indian
producers tightened after 1555 because of a strategic change in the point of
delivery of tribute. Prior to this time, the point of tribute exchange took place
in the cities; thereafter, the exchange took place in the villages.' Once the
middlemen got to the villages, the Spanish colonists saw the price of staple
products rise exponentially because of the increased field of monopolistic and
195. See id. at 23.
196. See id. The institution of repartimiento was also called rueda, tanda, cuatequil, and,
in Peru, mita.
197. See id. at 25.
198. See id.
199. See iU.
200. See GIBSON, supra note 153, at 232.
201. See FRANK, supra note 13, at 27.
at 26.
202. See id.
203. See id. at 27.
204. See id.
205. See GIBSON, supra note 153, at 93-94.
206. See id.
207. See FRANK, supra note 13, at 29.
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speculative middleman activity.' The conduct of the corregidores in their
dealings with the Indian population was not atypical behavior. The Spaniards
who came to the colonies were largely fortune seekers who had limited or no
opportunity for wealth attainment in their native Spain.' The Spanish
colonists routinely used their European status to dominate and exploit the
Indians."'
The Monarchy's attempts to protect the Indians from such abuses, through
legislation and other methods, failed because of the inherent contradictions of
its policies."' The Crown, whose economy was dependent on tributes from
its colonies, enacted legislation favoring "capital accumulation," which led to
greater Indian suffering and required stronger Indian protection policies and
legislation."' In this regard, the Monarchy's primary role was that of
progenitor of capitalism, but it was also a Christian monarchy inexorably
bound to the Catholic Church."' Thus, its efforts to protect Mexico's
indigenous populations was motivated in large part by an obligation to provide
moral leadership to its colonies."" The Monarchy's paternalistic treatment
of the Indians, therefore, projected an image of benevolence and compassion
to its subjects that reinforced its moral authority.
The General Indian Court grew out of the Crown's paternalism toward its
Indian subjects."' In the eyes of monarchy, Indians were like children and
as such needed protection from the evils of civilized society. The court,
thusly, was forged, "in the concerns for social welfare and social justice, as
the sixteenth century conceived them."2 6 It was designed to ease the trauma
of the assimilation of Indians into Spanish society. 7 The court's legal
interventions on behalf of Indians in colonial Mexico provided some small
measure of protection 1 In time, however, it was viewed by the growing
population of criollo, who often lived side-by-side with Indians, as an unfair
benefit."' The General Indian Court was abolished as part of the
revolutionary vision of a united nationm

208. See id.
209. See FAGAN, supra note 2, at 281.
210. See id. at 289-91.
211. See FRANK, supra note 13, at 30; see also CARMELO VINAS MEY, EL REGIMEN
JURIDICO Y LA RESPONSIBILIDAD EN LA AMERICA INDIANA, UNIVERSIDAD NACIONAL
AUTONOMA DE MExico 1, 34 (1993).
212. See, e.g., BORAH,supra note 10, at 25-34.
213. See, e.g., FAGAN, supra note 2, at 281-83.
214. See, e.g., BORAH, supra note 10, at 6-24.
215. See, e.g., id.at 25-34.
216. Id. at 409.
217. See id.
218. See id.
219. See id.
220. See id. at 406, 409. Borah explains that the judicial functioning of the Court ended
when the provisions of the Constitution of 1812 were implemented in 1820. The dismantling of
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The concept of a dual economy was perpetuated by the Crown in spite of
the fact that a single colonial economy was clearly emerging. This integrated
colonial economy developed along two axes: east-west and north-south."
The east-west axis was the Mexican leg of the Spanish global commercial
axis passing through Cuba to Spain in the west and extending through the
Philippines to China in the east.m The north-south axis known as the
Camino Real ran through Oaxaca to Chiapas to the south and up through
Sonora in the north.' After Mexico's share of tribute had been sent to
Spain, Mexico City consumed the remainder of the economic surplus
extracted from along the two axes.'
The integration of Mexico into the world capitalist economy necessarily
caused it to penetrate deeper and deeper into the Indian economy.' The
appropriation of Indian lands for Spanish commercial agriculture and ranching
meant that the Indian agricultural-based economy declined.2" The appropriation of Indian land also meant the loss of sources of fresh water and
firewood.' The Monarchy's active participation in the development and
expansion of these industries ensured Indian opposition or protest over the lost
of their lands. The loss of these lands was viewed unsympathetically by
colonial authorities. Those Indian farm lands not acquired outright by the
Spanish were rendered nonproductive because of land encroachment. Where
competing land uses occurred simultaneously in a farm region, it was usually
the Indian farmers who lost the competition. Their lands were frequently
trampled under by the herds of cattle and sheep that roamed unrestrained
across the Mexican countryside.' Little by little, Indian farmers were
forced into subsistence farming.
The Spanish acquisition of Indian lands was driven primarily by economic
considerations; that is to say, "the Spaniards appropriated Indian lands where
these were productive (and for that reason), in or near a center of high
population density which provided a market for what was produced." ' The
acquisition of Indian land was accomplished by a number of methods:

the colonial system of protection would take time. "It involved doing away with the court and

analogous institutions elsewhere, the administrative functions of the Court, the levy that supported
it and its officials, the staff officials, and that inevitable residue, their records." Id. at 406.
221. See Pierre Chaunu, Comentario en Francois Chevalier, Laformacion de los grandes
latifundios en Mexico [The Formation of the Great Latifundios in Mexico], PROBLEMAS
AGRICOLAS E INDUSTRIALES DE MExico, Jan.-Mar. 1956, at 527.
222. See id.
223. See FRANK, supra note 13, at 17. The axes crossed in Mexico City. See id.
224. See id.
225. See id. at 30.
226. See id. at 32-33.
227. See id. at 33.
228. See id. at 32; see also WOLF, supra note 149, at 198 (stating that "Sheep ate men" in
Mexico "just as they did in England").
229. FRANK, supra note 13, at 35.
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purchase, extortion, or attaining a grant of land called merced. Such land
grants were initially acquired from military leaders and, later, municipal
authorities." Near the end of the sixteenth century the Spanish instituted a
policy of Indian resettlement which concentrated the supply of labor in
regions where it was needed 2 The resettlement policy, called the
congregacion,was used to expand Spanish acquisition of Indian lands. They
used the policy to relocate Indians living on lands they wanted.' Once the
Indians were removed, their former lands, which had been declared vacant,
were seized by Spanish latifundistas.' The loss of Indian lands to the
Spanish quest for capital accumulation ultimately diminished the trading
power of the Indians and further eroded their economic solvency.
The separation of the Indian population from their lands and their
subsequent transformation into wage labor, albeit forced labor, was part of
Mexico's progressive transition to a capitalist economy." Even in the early
years of Mexican capitalism, however, monopolies abounded.'
The
tendency toward monopolistic capitalism may be a product of the cultural
milieu. The colonial period for the average Spaniard in Mexico was a time
of "great expectations." The opportunities for wealth accumulation by the
most enterprising colonists were considerably more favorable in Mexico than
in Spain." The lack of legal or moral constraints on the conduct of Spanish
colonists created a laissez-faire environment dominated by extreme
demonstrations of greed. In such a climate the Spanish latifundio was
born.
3. The Latifundio-Hacienda(1580-1630)
Between the years 1575-1580 Europe experienced an economic depression. "9 It was during this time (1575-78) that a major epidemic struck the
indigenous population of Mexico, further decimating their numbers.' The
extraordinarily high death toll among the Indians created a severe labor
shortage, which in turn led to a severe food shortage." Consequently, the
demand for supplies, especially foodstuffs, exceeded the availability.' The
230. See id.at 22-23.
231. See id. Although pasture lands were originally excluded from mercedes grants, the
blatant violation of this prohibition forced the Crown to recognize the occupation of pasture lands.

232. See id. at 27.
233. See id.

234. See id.
235. See id. at 25.
236. See id. at 36.
237. See FAGAN, supra note 2, at 287.

238. See id. at 282-83.
239. See FRANK, supra note 13, at 37.

240. See id. at 39.
241. See id. at 40.
242. See i at 41.
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situation was exacerbated by the fact the Spanish population, consisting
primarily of consumers, grew while the Indian population, consisting primarily
of producers, declined. Hoarding and speculation made the shortages worse
which sent prices and inflation spiraling out of control. 3 The economic
fortunes of Mexico were further depressed by the decline in mining
production - a decline attributable to the Indian labor shortage and the
depletion of easily accessible surface ores.'
The colonial government's attempts to stabilize the economy produced
mixed results. The posito and the alhondigawere two of the most significant
anti-inflation measures enacted by Spanish authorities.
The posito was an
official agency established to reduce shortages and speculation by buying at,
"officially pegged prices when these [foodstuffs] were low on the free market,
and selling at lower ceiling prices when the free market price was high." 46
The failure of the posito to curb inflation led to the establishment of the
alhondiga. The alhondiga was a depository for foodstuffs, in short supply,
purchased in large quantities by the colonial government on the open
market.247 These foodstuffs were kept in stock and sold at below market
prices during periods of scarcity."a Although the alhondiga was more
effective at curtailing speculative activity in the marketplace than the posito,
it could not stop the great market fluctuations.
Some historians believe the appearance of the latifundium/haciendasis the
result of the Mexican economy turning in on itself during this depression."u
Borah, for example, in his essay, New Spain's Century of Depression,
attributed this phenomena to the efforts taken by the Spanish to correct their
contracting economy:
[F]rom 1576 until well over a century later New Spain had a
contracting economy... [t]his long period of depression was a
major factor in molding the Mexican land and labor systems
which became dominant in the seventeenth century and remained
so to the Revolution of 1910.... The efforts of the Spanish to
solve this problem, to continue to draw products and services in
accustomed volume from the Indian understrata, speeded up and
perhaps led directly to a radical reorganization of land holding
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and labor forms which greatly extended and strengthened the
emerging hybrid Mexican Culture.'
In sum, the haciendas were created by the economic retrenchment of the
white ruling class during the years of cultural isolation caused by Spain's
decline.
Another more persuasive explanation is offered by Andre Gunder Frank.
He argues that the latifundium/haciendaswere initially developed and grew
to produce meat, wheat, hides, and other products for the rising demands of
the cities of Central Mexico and the mining operations in the north." The
latifundium/haciendas, therefore, were not a Old World feudal institution
transported to Mexico but rather an indigenous one which continued to
function as a capitalist enterprise during the depression years. 2 The interest
in agriculture production during this time was prompted by two things: (1) the
declining profitability of mining, a major industry, which freed up capital for
investment in new ventures, and (2) the profitability of food productionY'
"The hacienda grew primarily in response to its profitability, which in turn
was a function of increased demand and price for its products and decreased
supply from other sources."' The monopolization of land, one of the
dominant characteristics of the hacienda, was also a byproduct of this
profitability."
After the epidemic of 1576, Spanish hacendados, the term for the owner
of a hacienda, began to acquire lands known as the tierra baldas, or vacant
lands .' The accumulation of these lands helped to create the large semifeudal estates the public began to associate with haciendas.' Legal
approval for the hacendados' acquisition of the tierrabaldas lands, however,

did not occur until years later." In 1593, the Spanish Crown, as a result of
its economic woes, demanded payment from Spaniards in possession of tierra
baldas or demasias, lands acquired extra-legally." The Crown's demand for
payment was made more attractive by its promise to convey title to the
holders of these lands.'n Specifically, the Monarchy promised that upon
receipt of a specified sum of money the demasias land would be legalized
through the granting of a composiciones.' By legitimizing the hacendados'
250. Id.
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monopolistic acquisitions of land, the Monarchy publicly acknowledged a fact
that was self-evident: it could no longer control the economic destiny of
Mexico.? Through the legal mechanism of the composiciones, the hacendados were able to obtain title to lands illegally acquired, including those
taken from Indians.' Ultimately, the hacendados profited more from the
arrangement than the Crown, whose capital-generating strategy failed to
recover the full value of all the property it had illegally acquired.'
Indian communities were entitled to protection under the law, but
unscrupulous Spaniards often contended that their communities, usually those
located on highly desirable land, were not legally constituted. 5 By 1599,
"armies of commissioners and scribes were sent to throw the Indian towns off
the lands wanted by the Spaniards and Criollo latifundism . . . ." Some
Indian chiefs were forced to sell land to hacendados because lands within
their communities without owners reverted to the Crown. 7 The Indian
depopulation caused by the ravages of European epidemics had left many
parcels of land vacant.'n Selling these lands at least allowed the community
to realize some financial gain.' Indian lands were also lost to hacenados
because of the owners' indebtedness. Generally, once these lands were sold,
they were lost to the Indian owner forever.' The best explanation for the
Indians' inability to protect their land is that they were no match for the
economically and politically entrenched latifundistas."
The land monopoly of the latifundistas gave rise to a new form of
organized labor. Instead of the repartimiento, which was abolished by a
cedula of 1601, workers were given the control over their labor.' n Mexican
agricultural workers called gananes, laborios, or naborios were for the first
time free to choose their own employer.2' The concept "free labor" was
deceptive because in practice the workers were bound to the land. 4
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Latifundistas used a variety of methods to hold onto their Indian laborers:
physical force, the offer of competitive wages, and, finally, advances of cash
and goods.
This latter form of enticement led to the creation of debt
peonage;' 6 that is to say, laborers accepting cash or other goods from the
latifundista were forced to work off their debt. The economic cycles of the
haciendas had a corresponding affect on the tenants. "[I]n general commercially bad times for the hacienda permitted a higher level of subsistence for
tenants, while demand-generated expansion of hacienda agriculture led it to
deprive tenants of more of their labor and land."'2 This pattern was
especially pronounced at the end of the eighteenth century after the introduction of "free trade.""
C. Social Reorganizationof the Indian Community
Under the yoke of Spanish colonialism, the Indian tribes experienced what
some historians call a period of deculturation as a result of miscegenation and
acculturation.' What is clear is that the Spanish arrived in Mexico with a
blueprint for conquering and civilizing the Indians.' The plan at the local
level, where it directly impinged on the Indians, consisted of two distinct
programs. ' One program was administered by Spanish missionaries; the
other was administered by Spanish civil authorities.
The mission program of acculturation sought to integrate Indians into
Spanish culture by forming them into largely self-sufficient communities
under the direction of Jesuit and later Franciscan missionaries za Needless
to say, in the process of "civilizing" Indians the missionaries would convert
them to Christianity. The missionary program of the Jesuits, in particular, was
focused on the maintenance of a nonsecularized Indian community which
continued to operate as a political, social, and economic unit.' Their goal
was "less an effort to transfer individuals from an Indian-type community to
a Spanish-type community than it was to remake Indian communities into
tightly knit, church-centered social units, with Indian leadership (under one or
a few Jesuits) still operative."'
In contrast, those Indians living in or around Spanish towns were assimilated into wholly Spanish-controlled social units.' Indians living in this
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environment were often separated from their kinship network and forced to
assume a new identity: slave laborern ' They were exposed to the class
stratification that separated and distinguished Spanish social groupings in
towns. In no time, the urban dwelling Indians learned that the distinction
between rich and poor was a permanent arrangement based on the sacredness
of "pure Spanish blood."'
Under this social arrangement, Indians and
mixed bloods were relegated to a life of service to the gente razon, or white
upper class.'
The two modes of cultural exchange instituted by the Spanish were deeply
at odds with one another.' Instead of being complementary systems, the
two mcdes of enculturation were at cross purposes: "The heart of the conflict
lay in the fact that the missionaries conceived of a transitional institution, the
self-sufficient agricultural community, as a necessary vehicle for bringing
Indians into Spanish civilization while the civil administrators wanted prompt
and direct integration of Indians into Spanish-style communities.""4 The
Spanish civil administrators resented the relative independence of Indian
mission villages because there was no clear political integration with Spain,
no development of the Indian as an individual wage earner and no obliteration
of the Indians "pre-contact" identity. With the subsequent expulsion of the
Jesuits, the secularization of the mission villages began. The responsibility for
the execution of the Spanish Indian program was transferred to the civil
administrators.'
In an effort to maintain tighter control over the indigenous populations, the
Indian communities were forced by Spanish authorities to adopt a Spanish
style of local government. 3 Key Indian officials, as determined by the
Spanish understanding of their sociopolitical status, were singled out and
given Spanish titles which corresponded to their position in the Indian
community.'
Thus, the tribal parentela unit, the calpulli, which elected its own
council and governed a particular district, was equated with the
Spanish barrio, and its council with the standard municipal
council, called ayuntamiento. The various elders and chiefs, who

community).
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did not hold their office by right of inheritance were mistaken by
the conquerors for a hereditary nobility.'
By organizing the Indians into an acceptable European framework, the
Spanish were able to impose obligations upon the newly created Indian
nobility which served their economic and political objectives.2' The Spanish
called the class of Indian nobles cacique.
Although these foreign lines of authority were initially confusing to the
Indians, in time they conformed to the new order." This system of selfgovernment, however, diluted the political power of the Indians because it
imposed a weak leadership upon them. Most significantly, it stymied the
development of an authentic or indigenous leadership with the ability to
operate within the framework of a European-based power structure." This,
of course, was the Spanish objective. The establishment of a Spanish-type
governmental structure was for the benefit and convenience of the Spanish.
The Indian leaders and officials were never intended to be more than a puppet
government.' This fact was not lost on the Indian nobles.3"
In order to secure the caciques' loyalty, the Spanish conferred special
treatment and privileges upon them." The caciques, in exchange, were
expected to enforce Spanish policies which were often detrimental to their
people." Not surprisingly, the caciques identified with their Spanish
masters. It was not long before they, too, began to invest in the process of
building capital through capitalist enterprises. 3" "From 1530 on, concessions
of lands to Indian governors, caciques, and important persons in the villages
were frequent. Most caciques who received land concessions from the Crown
sold part of the lands to Spaniards immediately after acquiring them."' The
caciques'influenceand control over Indian labor during the years immediately
following the conquest also allowed them to accumulate capital through the
sale of labor to the Spanish. 5 It was not uncommon for Indian nobles to
295. IL
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amass fortunes from the exploitation of their own tribe. The malfeasance of
the cacique, in particular, became so notorious that the modern term
caciquismo refers to the system of dominion by these often corrupt, petty
officials. 6
The hispanization of the Indian community, through intermarriage and
acculturation, weakened the social and moral fiber of the tribe.' "Within
a few generations of the Conquest, Aztec society was a homogeneous,
poverty-stricken shadow of its former hierarchical self."3" Yet it is the
hispanization of Indians, the fusion of Spanish and Indian, which is the source
of the criollo culture that now dominates Mexico. More importantly, distinct
Indian cultures managed to survive the Spanish program of "civilization."
IV. The Post-ColonialEpoch: The PorfirianLegacy
The post-colonial economy was in shambles after the war of independence
from Spain. Civil society, caught in the middle of a power struggle between
liberal and conservative political factions, remained disorganized and impotent
in the face of mounting economic pressures.' The national government
stepped into this leadership vacuum and, to secure its power and authority
over civil society, assumed total responsibility for the economic well-being of
Mexico. The brass ring of political power would slip through the fingers of
the liberals and ultimately be seized by the conservatives. Although the
conservatives would eventually stand at the helm of the "ship of state," the
constitutional framework of the national government would be the product of
liberal-inspired ideology.3 " The exclusion of Indians from meaningful
participation in the establishment of a post-independence government was
consistent with the "Mexico for Mexicans" policy endorsed by politicians of
this era" The Mexican government's search for a final solution to its
"Indian problem" set the stage for the brutal and repressive government of
Porfirio Dfaz. 2
Porfirio Dfaz was the first of a long line of strong, paternal presidents in
Mexico. He built a political coalition of opposition groups through "dealmaking," trading the power of the presidency for support."' Public corruption became a feature of his regime and created a legacy that still colors
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Mexican politics. The thirty-year reign of Dfaz, however, would help to
solidify the federal or national government structure of Mexico.314 Marching
under the banner of "free trade," Dfaz would usher in a short-lived period of
economic expansion?" The infusion of foreign capital helped to mask the
underlying weakness of the Mexican economy and the festering class tensions
exacerbated by shortsighted federal policies."' In the end, Dfaz's free trade
policies destabilized the domestic economy and shattered the fragile social
peace built on the backs of Indian and Mexican laborers.317
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A. The Politics of Land Redistribution
The end of the royal regime left the Indians of Mexico at the mercy of
Mexican nationalists.319 Any hope that the revolution for Mexican independence would improve the plight of Indians was quickly dashed. The
appropriation of Indian lands by transitory constitutional governments and the
exclusion of Indian leaders from full participation in the establishment of a
nationad government sent a simple but clear message: Indians were relegated
to lower class status; they were excluded as partners in the revolution in spite
of the common cultural heritage of all Mexicans.' The Indians, particularly
the Yaqui of Sonora in northern Mexico, realized that the political agenda of
the Mexican revolutionaries was, with few exceptions, hostile to their
The growing tensions between the post-colonial Mexican
interests."
government and Indian tribes would eventually erupt into armed conflict."
The seeds of this conflict, however, were sown during the 1821-1856
ideological battles between the liberal and conservative political factions in
Mexico.' As a result of this ideological conflict, "[tlhe indigenous communities that survived the colonial period became the target of a class war
between the bourgeois and colonial patron, between nascent capitalism and the
ancient regime."3"
The origin of the ideological differences between liberals and conservatives
is the economic stagnation that characterized the post-colonial period in
Mexico. The monopolistic land tenure system in Mexico had created a rigid
agrarian structure which retarded capital expansion."z "Not only was the
circulation of labor and capital frozen, but state growth was stunted, taxes
were ignored, and public debt mounted."3 The former colonial class
structure fragmented into warring factions." These factions soon divided
into two political camps: the liberals and the conservatives.
Mexican liberals were greatly influenced by the "classic" liberalism of
France, Bourbon Spain, and the United States." One of the leading liberal
thinkers of this era was Jose Maria Luis Mora."' The tenets of Mexican
liberalism, as articulated by Mora, were political empowerment of the agrarian
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bourgeoisie who adhered to a capitalist ideology; the separation of the Church
from the state and the divestment of its wealth; and the colonization of the
frontier and pacification of the Indians.' In order to create a viable political
organization, "the liberals formed a political alliance with the incipient
mineral, agricultural, and commercial bourgeoisie of the northern and northcentral states. The interests of this group included extending the internal
market network and guaranteeing the political stability and productive
progress of the nation"33' This liberal platform would become the guiding
force behind the policies of the newly independent Mexican government. The
consequence of consolidating these liberal forces around a free market of
property and the "Europeanization" of the frontier, however, was the
degradation of the dispossessed. The Indian communities, in particular, would
suffer greatly under liberal policies. 32
The basic problem with the conservatives, from the prospective of the
liberals, was their commitment to a colonial economic structure that the
liberals considered to be an impediment to capitalist progress.33 Yet the
liberals equated property ownership with "civic virtue" because, as they
reasoned, only property holders possessed the requisite qualification to be
good citizens. In this regard, liberals had a lot in common with the conservative latifundistas outside of the political arena.33"
One of the leading conservative leaders of this era was Lucas Alaman.
According to Alaman, the goals of conservatives in Mexico during the critical
time of nation-building were to (1) preserve Catholicism; (2) create a strong
central government; (3) oppose federalism and popular elections; (4) support
new territorial divisions, for better administration; (5) garner support for a
strong armed force; (6) fight against the creation of a congress; and (7) solicit
European assistance.33 The conservatives tended to represent the interests
of the colonial bourgeoisie, the latifundistas, and the Catholic Church.'
Despite having an established power base, their control over the military and
the post-colonial economic machinery, the conservative platform did not
appeal to the legions of poor criollos 37 Although the first stirring of
revolution began in the ranks of the conservatives, they were unable to sustain
the momentum to consolidate their power in a centralized national government?'
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In the ensuing power struggle, both political camps manipulated the
Mexican workers, especially the Indians.3"
The conservatives argued that Indian uprisings were a product of
liberal attacks on the colonial system and the expansion of the
economy at the expense of the Indian. The liberals, on the other
hand, blamed the campesino insurrections on the colonial system
itself - the invidious combination of the "cruel yoke of cominunity," "communal vice," and frustration caused by the lack of
private ownership.'
The solution to these internal conflicts, according to the conservatives, was the
reorganization of the corporate society created by colonialism."
In contrast, the liberals' plan to achieve social peace exposed the racist
motivations behind their stated political objectives. Specifically, "[t]he liberals
pledged to liquidate the 'communist' Indians and 'repress the colored classes,'
on behalf of the new order of land tenure."' 2 Such racist views were openly
expressed by respected liberal thinkers like Mora, who stated one of the goals
of the colonization of the northern frontier was the eventual assimilation of
pure Indian races into the Mexican race: "All activity, we could almost say
all intelligence, resides in the Spanish race; luckily the indigenous race...
is coming to be a kind of auxiliary mass whose importance is invaluable if we
know how to direct it well."' 3
By the time of the reforms of 1850-1859, the liberals had coordinated a
political program based on the original principles enunciated by Mora.'
More importantly, the popularity of liberal ideology in Mexico allowed liberal
thinkers and politicians to define the function and responsibilities of the
emerging national government and that of civil society; 5 that is to say, the
liberals had began to argue for state control over all property based on the
theory that property is a byproduct of the social pact.' According to liberal
thought, the state, as the representative of society, had the absolute right to
regulate or redistribute property to stimulate the circulation of wealth.~7 By
investing the state with the ultimate power to control the distribution of land,
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liberal politicians believed they had the legal weapon needed to break the
back of the much-hated colonial land tenure system."8
The shortcoming of this plan lay in the structural weakness of Mexican
civil society. In particular, the lack of a landed middle class and existence of
only a fledgling industrial bourgeoisie created a structural weakness that
would become manifest during the period of land reforms. 9 The liberals
would soon discover that the monopolistic traits of Mexican society made it
an unsuitable partner in the state's effort to institute a new land tenure system.
It would become apparent that the gross class inequities in Mexican society
would consistently distort the public will that the liberal state was obliged to
uphold. If the liberal plan was to succeed, the state would have to assume the
role of the protector of the dispossessed. The state, in effect, would have to
usurp one of the basic functions of a civil society, translating the political will
of government into reciprocal social action."5 It would also have to counterbalance the force of politics in the lives of its citizens, another function served
by civil society.35' In other words, "[clivil society, as the realm of private
production and depoliticized rights - including the right of accumulation commands many of the institutions of order in society, removing power over
the daily routine of society from the public/political realm."" In economic
terms this meant that the state became the market with regards to the
disposition of property in particular, and capitalist accumulation in general. u
This constituted a fundamental change in the role of the government and
of civil society in relationship to the marketplace. The Mexican state, rather
than civil society, shouldered the burden for the economic success of the
entire country.
The roles of the state and civil society as modeled under the
liberal framework had been changed radically, due to the many
structural and conjunctural differences which marked the nascent
dependent economy. It was in this role distortion that land
became a primary question of political legitimacy in post-independence Mexico."
The state, having usurped many of the functions of civil society, used the
promise of land to diffuse the tensions created by class inequities and land
reform measures, and to revitalize the fledgling economy through the
redistribution of "idle" land for more productive uses."' These important
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reforms, however, would not occur until much later in the liberal movement.
The initial objective of the liberals was to wrest away political power from the
Catholic Church.3" The method used to accomplish this goal would also
lead to the loss of Indian communal lands.3
In keeping with its stated political agenda, the liberal- controlled, postindependence government enacted the 1856 Decree of Desamortizacion,
ordering the sale of all agricultural lands owned by civil or ecclesiastical
corporations.35 "The decree defined as corporations all religious communities of both sexes, confraternities, congregations, brotherhoods, parishes,
municipalities, schools, and, in general, all establishments or foundations
having the character of perpetual or indefinite duration. 359 The government,
through the enactment of subsequent regulations, made clear its intent to
include indigenous parcels and communities in the definition of corporations.' All Indian communal lands were lost as a consequence of this
decree but the church managed to retain its properties by threatening to
excommunicate land speculators." Not only did Indians lose their lands,
they were deprived of their capacity to contest the government's actions
because they were no longer considered a legal entity entitled to rights of
appeal.'
Not satisfied with legal dispossession of land belonging to the Church and
Indians, the liberals next added article 27 to the Constitution of 1857, which
deprived all corporations of the legal capacity to acquire or administer real
property. This time ejido property was ensnared in the land dispossession
net.' The liberal vision of a brave new world order that would begin with
the redistribution of communal lands to the propertyless masses, who would
become, in turn, good citizens and budding capitalists, was threatened by the
Church's refusal to comply with the Decree of Desamortization.3" Determined to bring its most powerful foe to its knees, the government ordered the
nationalization of all lands belonging to the Church in 1859.7 Lastly, from
1863 to 1894 laws were passed authorizing the patenting of unoccupied lands,
which was construed by the government to include Indian lands. 67 In effect,
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all lands not clearly titled were subject to denuncia, a declaration that the land
in question was unoccupied and, thus, subject to expropriation.' Surveying
companies, hacendados, public officials, and foreign investors purchased a
large percentage of the property made available through these laws. 9 Those
parcels left unclaimed by land speculators and hacendados were the
undesirable, nonarable plots.
The effect of the sale of national lands has been likened to the rotation of
capital among a small elite 7 The wealth of Mexico, which was still an
agricultural-based economy, became more heavily concentrated in the bands
of the latifundistas, land speculators, and public officials"' It has been said
of the policies of disentailment that "some rich people added to their fortunes
and no poor person found remedy for his poverty."' This would become
the lament of the majority of Mexicans under Porfirio Dfaz, the "Great
Dictator," who ascended to the presidency after the defeat of the conservativebacked monarchy of Emperor Maximilian.3"
B. PorfirianEconomics
During the early years of Porfirio Diaz's presidency, Mexico experienced
tremendous economic growth.374 This growth was spurred by foreign
investments, especially in the northern frontier regions, which poured into
Mexico in response to the Porfiriato "pro-trade" policies. 7 The pattern of
aggregate economic growth showed that there were significant differences
among the sectors pf production in Mexico. 76 These disparities in sector
production also reflected regional differences."
The hacendados, in
particular, exhibited the regional divisions over Porfiriato economic policies
that would escalate in the declining years of the Dfaz regime. There were the
progressive bourgeoisie in the countryside who were opposed.to the traditional
hacendado system of debt-peonage, associated with the tiendas de raya, and
the waste or inefficient use of productive land characteristic of colonial-style
latifundismo.3" This was in stark contrast to the urban-based hacendados,

368. See STEvEN SANDERSON, AGRARIAN POPULISM, supra note 5, at 36.
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373. See MORELOS, supra note 57, at 138-44.
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who nceived the benefits of Porfirian favoritism: land and labor through
state-led programs of colonization and disentailment."
The export sector, consisting mainly of agriculture and mining enterprises,
showed the greatest aggregate growth.3" The success of exports in these two
sectors was dependent on three things: increased exploitation of natural
resources, the availability of cheap labor, and high levels of foreign investment and technology.3 " The decline in one or another of these inputs
required government manipulation of those remaining. More often than not,
labor bore the brunt of the fluctuations?'
The organization of labor also reflected regional and sector differences. For
example, in the north, employers who competed in a scarce labor market
dominated by foreign competitors depended on free wage laborers. In
contrast, the labor in the south consisted primarily of convicts and Indians,
deported through pacification and colonization programs, who were reduced
to a slave labor force. In the central region, the haciendas' land expansion
turned free Indians and criollos into rural laborers known as jornaleros(dayworkers). 3 In general, there was an increased dependence on the export
sector for employment throughout Mexico. This labor trend in conjunction
with the external orientation of the Mexican economy contributed to the
decline in the numbers of subsistence farmers."'
One of the consequences of the liberal reforms of the 1950s was the mass
dislocation of the poor who lost their lands through various dispossession
measures." 5 The now landless masses constituted the cheap labor supply
that fueled the growth of the mining and agricultural sectors of Mexico's
econorny. Government control over the forces which increased the supply
of labor, however, gave the Porfirian regime a potent bargaining "chip" when
seeking support for its policies among the hacendados 87 Their support was
needed to achieve the social peace the Porfiriato required to further its goals
of primitive accumulation, a precursor to industrial capitalism."8 ' The
increased labor supply created by dispossession, a characteristic of primitive
accumulation, was absorbed into production activities that generated surplus
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381. See id.
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value?' Those sectors that generated the most surplus value were in sectors
controlled by foreign interests.
Social peace, to the Porfiriato, was a valuable commodity because it
created a climate attractive to foreign investors whose capital investments
were critical to the economic stability of Mexico. The Porfirian government
maintained this fragile class peace, however, through the use of bribes and
other acts of presidential benevolence 3 ° "Throughout the Porfiriato, fortunes
were made through land legislation, wars of pacification, colonization and
survey concessions, and the manipulation of water rights."39' Such blatant
abuse of power and public corruption is a lasting legacy of the Porfirian
regime. The price of peace was the further distortion of the already gross
class inequities in Mexico3 by the concentration of even greater wealth in the
hands of the landed elite. 9
The Porfirian government's class-alliance with the conservative elite for the
purpose of primitive accumulation signaled a departure from liberal ideology
to that of positivism? 9 3 As expressed by the Porfiriato, positivism meant
defending "dispossession and aggregate economic growth without concerning
itself with ethical problems of concentrated land tenure. '3' The Porfirian
gamble would ultimately fail because of the inflexibility of the class structure
fostered by its positivist ideology. 95
From the beginning, the monopolistic proclivities of Mexican society
undermined Dfaz's primitive accumulation scheme. This was most evident,
however, in the agricultural sector. In agricultural production, producers for
the domestic market monopolized land and crops to drive up prices. At the
same time, producers for the export market expanded production, through land
and labor monopolies, to meet the growing demands of the international
market.3' The end result of these conflicting monopolistic strategies was
that land and labor for domestic food production began to evaporate. 97 In
sum, the domestic food supply of Mexico was sacrificed for the sake of the
cash crops exported to the international markets. 3" The impact of these
market distortions on the Mexican population was dramatic and poignant;
journalists began to report stories of mass hunger: "from Culiacan to Alamos
''3
nothing is being eaten but the roots and trunks of the mescal plants. 1

389.
390.
391.
392.
393.

See id. at 33.
See MORELOS, supra note 57, at 148-53.
STEVEN SANDERSON, AGRARIAN POPULISM, supra note 5, at 32.
See, e.g., MORELOS, supra note 57, at 148-53.
See STEVEN SANDERSON, AGRARIAN POPULISM, supra note 5, at 34.

394.
395.
396.
397.
398.
399.

1&
See id. at 50.
See id. at 40.
See id.
See iU.
Id.

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 1999

AMERICAN INDIAN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 23

The irony of this situation was that Mexico was in the midst of an
unprecedented "economic expansion," which the outside world heralded, while
the majority of Mexicans were starving to death. It was not that crops for the
domestic market were not being grown; it was that the volume of production
was inadequate to meet the needs of the Mexican population, which had
increased some 61% between 1888 and 19 10 .'oo The domestic food shortage
was at least partially attributable to the fact that the most backward and
inefficient units of productions provided the bulk of the domestically
consuned food staples. The surplus value generated by the aggregate
growth of the export sector could have been used to fund social welfare
programs to soften the economic impact of Mexico's transition toward
industrial capitalism, but this was not the case.
The surplus value was transmitted to the owners of the export sector, many
of whom were foreigners, and the reminder was distributed to the Porifirian
government, who used it for infrastructure development, cronyism, and bribes,
in an attempt to hold onto political power. The working class did not receive
its proportional share of Mexico's economic prosperity; in the end, the
workers were both ill-fed and underpaid. In fact, "[n]ot only were the
increases in productivity, accompanied by little or no increase in wages, but
due to rampant inflation, the real income of the worker was declining.""
Agricultural workers who received cash wages saw their income drop between
15% to 30% from 1877 to 1911. 4 Market fluctuations during the Porfiriato
regime fell heaviest on the shoulders of the exploited workers.' 3
The Porfiriato had launched a bold strategy for economic development in
a desperate attempt to pull Mexico into the world capitalist economy.' The
fact that Mexico's primary trade partner during the Porfirian period was the
United States is not surprising.' The United States had risen to core
member status in the nineteenth century as the leading industrialized nation
in the world economy.' In the context of the world economy, Mexico's
independence "merely eliminated the last vestiges of Spain's semi-peripheral
role and ended pockets of noninvolvement in the world economy in the
interior of Latin America."' The economies of industrial nations like the
400. See id. at 42.
401. See id. at 43.
402. See SUSAN SANDERSON, LAND REFORM, supra note 383, at 15.

403. Id.
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United States needed raw materials to turn into material goods and agricultural
products for its rapidly expanding urban populations" Mexico, because of
its close proximity to the United States, was under tremendous pressure to
convert to an industrial capitalist mode of production, for no other reason than
the fact it would be a better customer for the United States.41
It is readily apparent that the economic policies employed by the Porfiriato
were consistent with those used by traditional colonial powers to break up
noncapitalist societies:
This "break-up" was needed both to create markets and to
obtain supplies via commercial agriculture and mining. And while
the tactics used to reach these goals varied from one colonial
power to another, the basic strategy was universal, involving to a
lesser or greater extent the disruption of traditional self-sufficient
and self-perpetuating communities; introduction of private
property land; extending the use of money and exchange;
imposition of forced labor and recruitment of a labor force
depending on wages; destroying competitive native industry;
creating a new class structure, including fostering of new elite
groups as political and economic junior partners of the imperial
powers; imposition of the culture of metropolitan centers, along
with racism and other socio-psychological characteristics of
minority foreign rule.41"
Although the Porfirian policies were rooted in the dynamics and eccentricities
of the Mexican culture, it is not difficult to find the colonial or imperialist
influence in the substance of development plan actually implemented. To this
end, Mexico's economy was justifiably characterized as a "dependent
economy." Its relationship to the United States was so close that the economic
downturns there had devastating repercussions in Mexico.4 3 In retrospect it
is easy to see how Mexico's structural weakness - the lack of a developed
social class with a well-defined social conscience to lead civil society, to
organize productive growth, and to control capital investment and formation,
among other functions - made it particularly vulnerable to such external
influences.4 4

world economy - core, periphery, and semiperiphery. See id. at 40.
410. See Magdoff, supra note 56, at 18.
411. See, e.g., STEVEN SANDERSON, RECEDING FRONTIER, supra note 406, at 4-6.
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413. See STEVEN SANDERSON, AGRARIAN POPULISM, supra note 5, at 51. For example, a
severe economic contraction in Arizona in 1907 and 1908, simultaneous mine closings in northern
Mexico, and a bad harvest in 1909 caused massive unemployment even among the relatively
privileged workers in northern and northwestern Mexico.
414. See id. at 206.
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By 1910, four out of every five Mexicans depended on the land for
survival but only four in every 100 owned any land." 5 When the 1910
insurrection finally occurred, the land distribution in Mexico was as follows:
72 million hectares owned by surveying companies, another 46 million
hectares owned by 276 property holders, and 168 million hectares owned by
Spanish and French descendants. 416 These holdings constituted three-fourths
of the nation's land mass. 1 7 The collapse of the Porfirian regime did not
reverse the radical changes in the Mexican social structure which occurred
during his reign. Some land concessions were made to the Agaristas, based
upon the compromise embodied in article 27 of the 1917 Constitution, but
even the gains made through the Cardenismo period were reversed by the
conserative backlash that followed.1
C. The Indian Pacificationand Colonization Policies
The goals of Porfirio Dfaz, with regard to the development of the
northwestern region of Mexico, were to advance mining and agriculture export
interests through the pacification and dispossession of the Indians, particularly
the Mayo and Yaqui.419 Of the two tribes, the Yaqui proved the most
formidable and resilient. The program of pacification was, in effect, an
undeclared war against the Indians of Mexico. The open hostility of Indian
tribes, like the Yaqui, toward whites and their refusal to submit to white
domination further convinced the Mexican government of the need to find a
final solution to the Indian problem.4' Northern liberals and foreign backers
of the national railroad system, which was built through large expanses of
land in traditional Indian territories, demanded assurances from Porfirio Diaz's
government that aggressive measures to control the Indian-led insurrection
were planned.4 "

Military troops were sent to Sonora and other northern frontier towns to
pursue and subdue rebellious Indian contingents.4 Those Indians captured
in these military campaigns were, pursuant to government policy, to be

415. See id at 43.
416. See Vejar & Larkin, supra note 162, at 114.
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422. See id at 45-49.

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol23/iss2/2

No. 2]

LAND TENURE & FREE TRADE IN MEXICO

267

deported!' Many Indian prisoners, in fact, were deported to southern
regions of Mexico (i.e., Yucatan and Guerrero).' The Mexican military's
intense hatred of the Yaqui led to the formulation of a different policy for
captured Yaqui prisoners: "Exhausted by the [Yaquis'] interminable energy,
the Boletin Militar of the Expeditionary Force to the Northwest in 1914 coldly
remarked that, 'all of the Yaqui prisoners caught bearing arms were immediately shot, proving that the best Yaqui is a dead YaquiY..4 Interestingly, the liberal bourgeoisie of Sonora opposed the Porfiriato deportation
program not out of humanitarian concerns but because of the destructive
effect it had on the Indian labor supply.4'
In addition to military suppression and deportation, the Porfirian regime
declared the Yaqui lands baldios (vacant land) so that concessionaires could
subdivide and resell them' Since the Yaqui and Mayo occupied choice,
arable lands in Sonora, these lands were quickly transferred to hacendados,
survey companies, foreign investors, and the cronies of the President.4 The
Yaqui retreated to the mountains and continued their fight against the
genocidal policies of the Porfiriato.4
Over a nearly thirty-year period, the Porfirian solution, to the Indian
problem in Mexico would consist of pacification, starvation, deportation, and
extermination through massacre.4 The Mayo would capitulate in 1887, but
the Yaqui would continue their fight until 1929, even fleeing at various times
into the United States to escape Mexican persecution."" The Yaqui would,
again, become a force to reckon with during the volatile period of agrarian
organizing, from 1937-1939, in Sonora, Mexico.43"
V. The Modem Epoch: Resurrecting the Ghosts of PorfirianEconomics

The monopolistic tendencies of Mexican society have found expression in
the industrial age.433 Land monopolies have been replaced by commercial
423. See id. at 49.
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and international agricultural monopolies, and so the status quo remains
unchanged. The industrial bourgeoisie control the purse strings of the national
government, which needs their cooperation in order to buoy the economy and
maintain social peace.4 As the financially strapped government teeters on
the brink of disaster, it looks to foreign investors, following the yellow brick
road of NAFTA, to throw in a lifeline. The parallels between the modern
epoch and the free-trade era of Porfirio Dfaz,435 however, suggest that free
trade will open a Pandora's box of misery and chaos. Wrestling with their
own identity crisis, the Indian population of Mexico must tackle the problems
of privatization of communal lands4 and face an uncertain future without
land as their primary cultural anchor.
Surems and the Talking Tree
It has been many centuries, in times long gone, that the Yaquis
were not as they are now. They were Surems, a very little people
that lived in el Cerro Surem in Sonora. The Surems were a
peaceful, quiet people who couldn'tstand noise and violence. One
day, the people noticed a tree that seemed to be making noises in
a strange language. This tree was one big, ash-colored Palo
Verde, which was growing in the middle of the region, on
Omteme Kawi.
While the villagers gathered around,the leaders attempted to
communicate with the talking tree. However, it was of no use, not
even the most important leader could interpret the message.
During this time, a very young girl, Yomumuli, kept tugging at
her father's hand and whispering that she could understand the
talking tree. At first herfather ignored her, then he became angry
at her insistence. "All right,you will do it in front of the village,
and then you will be punished publicly for yourfoolishness."
So Yomumuli sat down close to the tree and translated word
fir word what the prophetic tree foretold for their future. It
warned of the coming of the white man with armor and new
weapons; it told of the coming of much strife and bloodshed
against these intruders and others, and of much suffering for a
long time among the Surems, but that they would eventually
437
overcome their adversaries.
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A. Free Trade in a Monopolistic Society
The origin of the monopolistic character of Mexican society is hard to
pinpoint. Yet it is a recurring theme, a sort of "economic wild card," that has
scuttled economic development and recovery plans and toppled presidencies.
The power players who hold this card are members of the same group that
has traditionally called the "shots" in Mexico: the landed elite, who in the
twenty-first century are known as the industrial bourgeoisie. While the intraclass tensions and divisions that characterized this group during the Porfiriato
have not disappeared, they are nevertheless bound by a common history of
privilege and power. When the Dfaz presidency ended, the Porfiriato social
structure of hacendados, bourgeois industrialists, public officials, and
merchants survived. They were the ones poised to move to the next stage of
capitalism - industrial capitalism - while the rest of country lagged far
behind.
Arguably, the adoption of a market political ideology was from the
beginning a mistake, given Mexico's postcolonial economic structure.438 Yet
the proximity to the United States would have made it virtually impossible for
Mexico to have developed as anything but a "dependent economy." 39 Thus,
the progression toward dependent capitalism continued even as the nascent
agrarian revolution began its struggle for land equity in the wake of the liberal
reforms, a tool of capital accumulation, that had turned so many Mexicans
into landless paupers.
The agrarian revolution that followed the Porfirian insurrection was shortlived. The great economic disparity between the classes reflected the equally
wide power gap between the hacendadosand campesinos. In a culture of such
extremes, the most the revolution could do is lead to "surface" changes in the
social structure; the status quo, in other words, did not change. For example,
those representatives sympathetic to the latifundistas used their influence to
win a compromise from the campesinos during the constitutional convention.
As a result, implementation of article 27 of the 1917 Constitution, the land
redistribution measure, was left to local governments. 44 Without the
guidance or oversight of a strong national government, which was crippled by
divisive conflict following the ouster of Dfaz's presidency, local caciqueswere
left to interpret national reform policy." The local governments, because
of their traditional alliance with the hacendados,were easily manipulated. The
reform laws passed at the local level contained a variety of exemptions for
property holders and imposed numerous restriction on the ability of agraristas

438. See STEVEN SANDERSON, AGRARIAN POPULISM, supra note 5, at 24.
439. IL at 207.
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to sue for land. The hacendados had little difficulty slipping through these
loopholes, and few campesinos received redistributed land."
When significant land redistribution finally occurred under the Cdrdenas
administration, it came with a price. The agrarian movement was co-opted by
the national government under Cdrdenas, who then legitimized it by creating
a state-controlled agency to defuse the political volatility of the campesinos!'" The agrarian movement's loss of autonomy and transfer of power
from the workers to the state meant it was "depoliticized."' The alliance
between worker and state that pushed Cdrdenas into the presidency coalesced
into a dominant political party that reigns supreme in Mexico."
The administration that followed Cdrdenas embarked on an aggressive
m ' These efforts were aided by the tremendous
program of industrialization.
growth in exports to the United States because of shortages caused by World
War Il.' This wartime boom led to a much heralded "economic miracle"
sustained primarily by agricultural development."8 It was also at this
juncture that latifundismo gave way to industrialized agriculture production
because of its greater margins of profit. It was due to this economic boom
that Mexico went through a period of "inward development," meaning it
concentrated on "expansion of commercial agriculture, protection of the
internal market, transfer of capital from the export sector to the domestic
sector, and the creation of a fundamental infrastructure to support importsubstitution."" 9 The economic miracle was buoyed by low worker wages,
favorable export tax tariffs, the expansion of the domestic market (created by
shortages of foreign imports), and low interest rates for investment borrowing."
The rural reform programs, however, were neglected in favor of
government investment in urban areas.4 " Overall public support of agriculture declined during this time. Some significant public investments in
agriculture were made, however, through the extension of credit for
modernization to large privately owned farms, agricorporations and agricultural bourgeoisie, the successors to the latifundistas, and the creation of
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government-supported irrigation districts 4 z Concomitantly, the public's
noninvestment in the small, rural farmers caused a decline in the productivity
of the ejidos, parvifundios, and minifundios that increased migration to the

United States and the urbanization of the campesinos!5
By the 1970s the decapitalization of the agricultural sector was reflected
in a reduction in revenues generated by the industry. The reduction in
revenues from agriculture, the engine that drove the economy, coupled with
the huge foreign debt and balance of payment problems created by expensive
public projects designed to stimulate domestic industries, contributed to a
growing economic crisis in Mexico. The discovery of petroleum in Mexico
in the 1970s and the availability of foreign credit based on the value of these
oil reserves allowed Mexico to borrow heavily to close "the gap between
public expenditure and public savings."4" This method of financing debt
proved disastrous for Mexico when in the 1980s a worldwide recession
occurred, followed by a more rapid-than-anticipated decline in the petroleum
dependency of industrialized nations, and the depletion of its capital reserves.
Mexico was left with a staggering foreign debt.45
Since the defeat of Porfirio Dfaz, power has shifted from the beleaguered
state to the dominant class. It is a change hard to detect because the state
continues to act in the role of paternalistic protector and benefactor of civil
society. It is business as usual except the Mexican Presidency and the
working class are subject to the will of the ruling class. The concentration of
economic and political power in the hands of the industrial bourgeoisie is a
significant change in the power structure of Mexico that forebodes trouble
ahead. The monopolistic tendencies of the bourgeoisie and the absence of a
well-extended middle-class, which forced the state to take over control of the
market in the first instance, continue to require state intervention, but the
scope of its intervention is dictated by the dominant class.
The transition to capitalism, which involves the concentration of wealth in
the hands of a single privileged class, has only reified the original colonial
social structure instead of creating a new class structure. The class antagonism of the colonial social structure, exacerbated by the forces of
capitalism, has caused the Mexican state to assume a nontraditional role in
relation to civil society. It is both a paternal protector and benefactor. The
state, in effect, counterbalances the inherent imbalance of the Mexican social
structure.
Without state social intervention on its behalf, the working class would be
at the mercy of a ruling class that has not shown interest in assuming the
state's role as the arbiter of social peace - a function which logic dictates a
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dominant class performs out of self-interest. In other words, those who have
the most to lose from the disintegration of society are usually the most
vigilant in maintaining civil order. Instead, from the days of the latifundista,
Mexico's ruling class has shown its primary interest has centered on wealth
accumulation or, more specifically, the monopolization of wealth. Free trade,
in this context, translates into new opportunities to amass wealth by the rich.
Stated more concisely, the industrial elite of Mexico, like the hacendados of
the Porfirian era, are willing to pursue economic policies that will ensure their
continued wealth accumulation, even if to do so leads to social chaos.
The aggregate growth of Mexico is still concentrated in the export sector.
Within the export sector agriculture and manufacturing dominate. 56
Mexico's effort to stimulate a strong internal market, to counter the poor
distribution of its aggregate growth, has failed. For example, the Import
Substitution Industries (ISI) program, financed by the Mexican government,
proved to be a tremendous economic drain that did not yield an adequate
return given the public investment.4 One of the impediments to the
development of a strong domestic market has been foreign competition and
the demand for foreign products.
Although there are many reasons for Mexico's weak domestic market, its
proximity to the United States is one reason. A large quantity of manufactured goods flow across the Unites States border to Mexican consumers.
Mexico is, in fact, a primary market for U.S.-produced goods. This means
Mexican manufacturers must compete against foreign manufacturers for the
pesos of the Mexican consumer. Setting aside considerations such as quality
of goods, marketing, and consumer preference, one of the impediments to the
competitiveness of Mexican producers in general is the lack of capital.45"
The Mexican banks, perhaps in response to the lopsided economic structure
in Mexico, do not extend long-term credit. Instead of banks or other
traditional financing sources, most Mexican entrepreneurs must rely on private
funding or family wealth.459 The only long-term loans available come from
the federal government and are given sparingly for projects in which it has an
interest. Those individuals with substantial family wealth, however, can
use their prominence to obtain bank financing.M Since commercial bank

456. See BARTRA, supra note 27, at 147.
457. See, e.g., STEVEN SANDERSON, RECEDING FRONTIER, supra note 406, at 9-28.
458. See STEVEN SANDERSON, AGRARIAN POPULISM, supra note 5, at 160.

459. See Paul Karan & D.G. Foulke, Commercial Real Estate Practicesand Development
in Northwestern Mexico: A ComparativeLiving Law Description, 1984 ARIZ. J. INT1L & COMP.
L. 10, 27. According to Dr. Boris Kozolchyk, Executive Director of the National Law Center for
Inter-American Free Trade, "Mexico does not have the banking system adapted to modem
commercial lending." FacilitatingFree Trade Through the Expansion of Credit, NOVEDADES,
Mar. 1997, at 3 (explaining that credit in Mexico is secured mainly by real property).
460. See Karan & Foulke, supra note 459, at 31.
461. See BARTRA, supra note 27, at 30.
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loans in Mexico are secured with real property, only those individuals with
substantial land interests could qualify for loans.' This excludes a majority
of Indians and Mexicans from access to commercial loans. Such restrictive
access to financing is another way rich Mexicans control or monopolize the
methods of wealth accumulation.
While free trade could lead to foreign investment in domestic industries,
the Mexican experience to date with foreign corporations, especially
multinational corporations, has not led to a more diversified domestic market.
There is evidence, in fact, which suggests the presence of foreign corporations
in host states with weak domestic industries retards the development of a
domestic market.
[S]tudies have shown that American multinationals tend to invest
in the most profitable host-state industries and then to be even
more profitable than their local competitors. As a result, host
states perceive that important segments of their economy are
increasingly subject to the control of multinational companies
rather than national firms.
The need to generate revenue through continued exports to international
markets poses a dilemma for Mexico in the area of agricultural production.
Since the 1970s Mexico has been unable to produce enough agricultural
surplus to meet the food demands for its expanding population. "Drought,
poor agricultural land, expensive farm inputs due to skyrocketing inflation,
and finally reduced government spending," have constrained agricultural
growth.' The water monopolies of the agricultural bourgeoisie have had a
devastating impact on the agricultural productivity of the minifundios, ejidos,
and Indian farmers. For example, during a Sonoran water crisis in the 1970s,
the private landholders responded to [the] problem not only with
renewed interest in complete control of on-site irrigation (which
they already had) but with a continuation of the wasteful land and
water management practices that had earned them the nickname
"the mining farmers." . . . [A]gricultural profit, like water, ran
through the fingers of the agricultural bourgeoisie of the
northwest, not stopping to replenish its source, the earth.'
Such incidents attest to the irrationality of the monopolistic tendencies of the
Mexican ruling class. Given these tendencies, Mexico's competing need for

462. See id.
463. DAVID BLAKE & ROBERT WALTERS, THE PoLITIcs OF GLOBAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS
93 (1976).
464. See STEVEN SANDERSON, RECEDING FRONTIER, supra note 406, at 128-29.
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bread and capital lends itself to the possibility of a Porfirian nightmare:
masses of starving wandering the Mexican countryside while the lush
agricultural lands of the bourgeoisie are filled with cash crops destined for the
international market.
Perhaps the most salient result of Mexico's land tenure system is the way
it has stifled the productive use of agricultural land by ninifundistas,
ejidatarios,and propietarios.By monopolizing the public resources allocated
for the modernization of Mexican farms, large agrocommercial and agroindustrial concerns have decreased the numbers of small farmers able to provide
an alternative food supply to the domestic market. This has made the
domestic market extremely vulnerable to manipulations by greedy speculators,
thereby making the reoccurrence of the Porfirian famines more likely.
The rapid industrialization of Mexico from the 1940 to 1970 accelerated
the cration of a large class of cheap labor. Those campesinos, unable to
live off the land because of increasingly reactionary government policies, have
been forced to sell their labor in the market place. The domestic market,
however, has been unable to solve the growing problems of unemployment,
underemployment, and urbanization.' Even the influx of foreign investment, in the form of multinational corporations, failed to stimulate the
creation of jobs in the domestic market because "the open door to foreign
capital sharpened the tendency toward capital intensive technology." 70
During the Porfirian regime, the inability of the fledgling industrial class,
in conjunction with the hacendados,to absorb the large numbers of displaced
workers created the economic tensions that gave rise to the 1910 insurrection.
The resulting agrarian revolution was spurred by the demand for land
redistribution, a demand to which the Mexican government was able to
accede. Conditions are different now. "In the past the government has used
land reform as one of the principal mechanisms of social control in the
countryside. It is apparent this will no longer be possible since there is little
additional cultivable land."4' ' Without land to detract from the genuine
issues of class conflict, such as the economic inequities of Mexico's class
structure, escalating social tensions could force unemployed workers to take
a more incendiary course of action. Jobs, in fact, lots of jobs, are benefits
Mexico hopes to derive from free trade. The ability of free trade, alone, to
generate sufficient numbers of jobs to reduce the ranks of the unemployed is
made more problematic because of Mexico's expanding population. For
467. See id. at 133-68.
463. See STEVEN SANDERSON, RECEDING FRONTIER, supranote 406, at 141. ("By 1960, the
number of independent farmers had declined both in absolute and in proportional terms. Rapid
demographic growth coupled with unfavorable agricultural policies led to an increase in the
number of rural migrants seeking to supplement insufficient farm incomes.").
469. See STEVEN SANDERSON, AGRARIAN POPULISM, supra note 5, at 159.
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example, the State of Sonora's Office of Tourism in Phoenix, Arizona, cites
its h'young and growing population" as a selling point in NAFrA materials
given to foreign investors looking for investment opportunities in Mexico:
According to the 1990 National Census, Sonora had a
population of 1,823,606 inhabitants. Population rose 1.9%
annually between 1980 and 1990. The state has a predominantly
young population with 36% of its inhabitants under 15 years of
age and only 5% age 65 or older. Consequently, Sonora has the
necessary human resources to meet the challenges of future
development!'
In the past, the Mexican president could rely on the political process to
help diffuse some of the social unrest generated by Mexico's class structure.
The Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI) has managed to deal
effectively with political dissension and threats to the status quo as
demonstrated by its handling of the student revolts during the presidential
elections of 1966!' The PRI political machinery has traditionally been
stoked by the executive branch of the Mexican government. As the dominant
political party, the PRI has used its power to legitimize or delegitimize
populist movements. This has been a very effective way of co-opting the
ideas of groups that began to gain mainstream acceptance. For example, by
bringing the agrarian movement under state control, the government was able
to delegitimize the revolutionary fringe by excluding them from participation
in labor leadership and was able to legitimize the mainstream factions by
incorporating their platform into its agrarian policies.4 4
The PRIs practice of silencing opposition and suppressing populist
movements may backfire. By not allowing political discourse to occur in the
open, it is forced underground. This is especially true of laborers who have
no access to the government other than through the state-controlled union 5
Attempts to organize outside this forum subject the organizers to state
reprisals. The exclusion of the laborers from the political process during the
Porfirian regime exacerbated their alienation from the state and contributed
to the incendiary climate that proceeded the insurrection 6 The political
alienation of significant numbers of Mexican workers could prove disastrous
in Mexico because of its current economic condition. Unless the political

472. SONORA MEXICO Now, SONORA - AN ECONOMIC OvERvIEW 6 (No. 2120, n.d.)
(official publication of the State of Sonora to provide information on investment and development
opportunities).
473. See STEVEN SANDERSON, AGRARIAN POPULISM, supra note 5, at 166. The student

rebellion was crushed through the use of thugs from Ola Verde, a right-wing vigilante group loyal
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process is expanded to include those laborer groups whose views place them
outside of the mainstream, the state is on a collision course with the growing
forces of discontented workers.4n This, too, is a lesson of the Porfiriato:
"[P]erhaps more important in light of the campesino support given to the
Madero rebellion, was that the Dfaz government was totally incapable of
supporting those classes which produced value in society.""47
The Porfiriato alliance with the hacendados helped to seal the fate of his
presidency. The Mexican state, too, has sealed its fate by acquiescing to the
power of the industrial elite. The power was not surrendered to them; rather,
control over the nation's economic policies was wrested away from the state
because of a lack of confidence in its economic leadership.4 ' The industrial
bourgeoisie flexed their considerable economic muscle and the state blinked,
evidenced by their ability to reverse the agrarian reform policies of President
Echeverria.' The weak bourgeois class of the Porfirian era has been
replaced by a class strong enough to force the state to capitulate to its
demands.
The state's loss of control over Mexico's economy places it in a precarious
position because the balance of power has shifted. The state's role as paternal
protector and benefactor of civil society has been compromised because it
does riot have the authority to bind all the classes by its actions. Class
antagonism cannot be diffused without an arbiter to maintain civil order.
The coalition created in the aftermath of the revolution was based on a
balance of power between the classes.' This balance of power is sustained
by a shared consensus or understanding that each class has the power to
initiate a conflict which will end in mutual annihilation.' The role of the
strong state has been to maintain this fragile coalition through economic
growth, which satisfies the needs of the bourgeoisie, and concessions to
populist demands, which appeases the workers." 3
The bourgeoisie's control of the economic sphere, to the exclusion of the
state, creates an imbalance of power which is manifested as a crisis in
leadership. The crisis could take place in a number of ways: (1) by both
classes rejecting the leadership of the weak state; (2) by one class withholding
its support from the state, which has already occurred except that the ruling

477. See Opening the Doorto Union Democracy in Mexico: 1 Year Later,NOVEDADES, Apr.

1997, at 1 (reviewing the affect three Supreme Court decisions have had on the right of workers
to organize). The author, University of Arizona College of Law Adjunct Professor Anna
Torriente, comments that one year after the decisions, "Union democracy in Mexico is still more
of a goal than a reality." ld.
478. STEVEN SANDERSON, AGRARIAN POPULISM, supra note 5, at 205.

479. See id at 171.
480. See id
481. See id. at 211.
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483. See id at 212.
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class, for the time being, has given its "conditional" support to the state; and
(3) lastly, by the state forming an alliance with one class against the other in
order to remain in power. The last scenario was the compromise the Porfiriato
made to hold onto power. The unanswered question is whether the state can
reclaim its economic authority. Given the state's weak position and traditional
affinity with the ruling class, it is doubtful. The workers, weary of
government neglect of populist interests, might ultimately challenge the
industrial bourgeoisie. Free trade cannot resolve these types of internal
conflicts within a nation.
B. The Cultural Crisis FacingIndigenous Tribes in Mexico
1. The Effects of Privatizationof Communal Lands: A Case Study of the
Chatino Indian Villages in Oaxaca, Mexico
The Chatino Indians in Oaxaca, Mexico do not live on reservations; rather,
they have organized themselves into distinct Indian communities. In 1988,
there were 30,000 Chatino living in twenty-three Chatino villages.4 The
government structure of these communities, which had been imposed on them
by Mexico, consists of municipios (counties) and agencias (towns).4 The
civil officials elected in the agencias are confirmed by the presidente
municipal (mayor) and are accountable to him.4 The presidente municipal
normally names a4 non-Indian secretary for the agencia to serve as a sort of
"cultural broker." " The secretary facilitates and regulates the integration of
the Chatino village into the dominant culture, through such functions as
collection of taxes and the administration of justice.4
The State of Oaxaca is divided into thirty districts, each with a district
capital."9 The Chatino villages are politically divided between two districts:
Juquila and Sola de Vega.49' Mestizos, individuals of mixed heritage, run
seventeen of the twenty-one Chatino villages through the manipulation of the
agencias or municipios!' The remaining villages are designated as "free"
municipio, although they too are subject to indirect control by mestizos.493
Indian traditions permeate the organization of local government.4
Constitutionally mandated posts permit men to alternate ranked religious posts
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with civil posts over the course of their life" Men who have completed
this ladder become elders of the community."' The committee of elders has
veto power over the civilian government and can force insubordinate elected
officials to resign.' Although the Chatino system of dispute settlement
conflicts with the Mexican-imposed system of government, the Chatinos
continue to rely on their traditional ways!" The Chatinos' distrust of the
non-Indians who control their communities further limits their access to
politicad power!' 9 The fact that the Chatinos are not geographically isolated
within Mexico but are in "theory" part of its pluralistic society presents unique
challenges.'
Violence had become endemic in Chatino villages and disputes over the
private uses of communal land was usually the flashpoint."' The process of
privatization of Chatino communal lands began during the 1930s-1950s, a
time when Mexico was a experiencing an economic boom because of World
War I.
There were shortages of food stuffs, like sugar and coffee, in
nations all over the globe because of the war. North American, growers
enlisted Mexican growers to help meet the rising demand for coffee on the
international market.' Mexican growers enticed campesinos to grow coffee
on their lands by offering them low-interest loans.' Mestizo farmers were
the first to grow coffee in the district, but after 1948, when the price of coffee
on the international market began to soar, the Chatino leadership could not
stop the introduction of coffee to communal lands.s The first reports of
coffee being planted on Indian lands began in 1949 in the village of
YaitepeC.5
The introduction of coffee as a cash crop to the Indian communal lands
had profound social consequences.' The planting of traditional crops like
corn, beans, and squash were suited to a collective system of land ownership.' The slash-and-burn method of cultivation was used to grow these
staple crops. The slash-and-burn method of cultivation restricts productive
use of the land to two to three years; thereafter, the land is left fallow for up
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to three years."' Conversely, the planting of coffee is an almost permanent
investment in the land because coffee trees do not typically begin to produce
until the fifth year and can remain productive up to 100 years. " ' The
planting of coffee, consequently, is inconsistent with the traditional cultivation
cycle and uses of communal lands 12
In addition, coffee only grows in a temperate climate and in areas with
natural shade because its leaves bum in the sun."' Only a few hectares of
communal lands in all of the Chatino villages possess the characteristics
necessary to grow coffee, and these lands are at a premium."4 The concentration of coffee plots in the hands of a few families is a source of
resentment among those tribal members who have been dispossessed of these
lands, and, concomitantly, the profits." 5 These resentments create social
tensions that erupt in violence. Sometimes these predominantly clan or family
confrontations turn into intra-tribal disputes which can divide barrios and
villages.5 6 Moreover, land in the Chatino culture is sacred; it is a sacred
trust given to them by their gods. 17 This adds a dimension to land conflicts
between Chatino Indians that non-Indians may not understand;" 8 that is to
say, preservation of communal lands is sometimes associated with protecting
the sacredness of the land." 9 As one Chatino writer stated:
For us, things should be collective. What we have learned, for
example, is that the land was given to the community and not to
individuals by the gods. That is why it was worked in common
and no one felt they were the owner of the land they worked.
Moreover, it is our belief that there is not just one god, but many,
and among them all, they collectively created the things they
give.'
It is unclear whether tribal members who own coffee plots view the land as
being less sacred than those who own no coffee lands. It appears, in any case,

510. See id.
511. See id.

512. See id.
513. See id.
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that the conflict over privatization of communal lands is more deeply rooted
in clas; antagonism and race-based divisions than religious doctrine. 2'
2. Surviving the Threat of a CulturalMeltdown: Preserving the Cultural
Identity of Tribes
The privatization of Chatino communal lands signaled the onset of a major
cultural shift. Through a process called cultural diffusion, traditional Chatino
values had been supplanted by those of the dominant culture. Cultural
diffusion usually entails replacement of the cultural traits of a weak group
with those of a dominant group." Since Indians have historically been the
most economically and socially marginalized groups within Mexico, cultural
diffusion poses a special threat to them.m
Cultural diffusion was at one time a matter of Spanish colonial policy."
It was used as a tool of social control;' that is to say, the destruction of
indigenous cultures was viewed as an acceptable means of securing and
maintaining control over subjugated populations. The culture of Indian tribes
throughout Mexico took on Western attributes as a result of this forced
inculcation. The magnitude of the cultural loss to indigenous people may
never be known because the diffusion of Western culture throughout the world
has operated like a giant eraser, eliminating the memory of what was and the
ability to understand it even if remembered. As one African writer, in support
of her arguments on the source of African customary law, explained:
"Through the years, there has been a diffusion of cultural elements and ideas
as various parts of the world have become inter-connected. Colonial
expansion diffused the legal traditions of Western Europe so much that
Western legal models have influenced most attempts to systematize and
conceptualize legal norms.'
Cultural diffusion is not, however, restricted
to situations of political aggression or cultural dominance. It also occurs, to
a lesser degree, whenever diverse social groups interact over extended periods
of time.

521. See id. at 94-95.
522. See generally OLMEC TO AZTEC SETrLEMENT PATTERNS IN THE ANCIENT GULF
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525. See, e.g., id.
at 25-40 (reviewing the process of cultural diffusion or absorption of the
Aztec after Spanish conquest).
526. L. Amede Obiora, ReconsideringAfrican CustomaryLaw, 3 LEGAL STUD. F. 217, 21718 (1993).

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol23/iss2/2

No. 2]

LAND TENURE & FREE TRADE IN MEXICO

281

The Chatino conflict over land is a manifestation of an underlying cultural
crisis. It is a crisis common to other Mexican tribes and one critical to their
survival. Simply stated, the tribes must figure out how to adapt to the social
and cultural demands of Mexico without losing their cultural identity.
Living in the shadow of the United States means that Mexican citizens are
bombarded with images of Western materialism. The generally impoverished
tribes of Mexico do not have the resources to create culturally based
alternatives that can provide individual members with the economic security
or prosperity they desire. The inability of Indian tribes to provide more than
subsistence living to most of their members aids in the process of cultural
diffusion. By excluding Indian tribes from full participation in Mexican
society, the criollo majority has ensured its continued cultural dominance.
Even those individuals who choose to pursue the gilded dream of the West
discover there are few social, economic, or political avenues open to them.
This is due in large part to the labeling of Indians as the "undesirable other"
in Mexican society. This label stigmatizes the Indians of Mexico much the
same way it does African-Americans in the United States. The white majority,
or the criollo majority in the case of Mexico, uses the label to make it
socially acceptable, though not necessarily legally acceptable, to discriminate
against the "undesirable other."' 7
Although the process of cultural diffusion, as it relates to the Indian tribes
of Mexico, is at work constantly, a tribe's identity can remain intact even if
substantial cultural changes occur. So long as the cultural core or the
"resident suchness" of a tribe is not lost, it can survive the onslaught of
cultural diffusion. Once the cultural core has been breached, however, social
disintegration soon follows. For example, land was critical to the Chatino
cultural identity. Consequently, the loss of this core value - i.e., the
communal ownership of land - destabilized the tribe and triggered a "cultural
meltdown." Yet given the historical resiliency of the tribes of Mexico, they
ought to be able to survive even the loss of communal lands.
The Chatino experience with privatization of communal lands demonstrates
that the external influences of capitalism and the lure of individual profits
pose a substantial threat to the preservation of cultural traditions. In a nation
of mostly landless people, land has a very market high value - a fact that
must be recognized by tribal councils. Considering the tremendous economic
pressures Mexico faces now and in the future, its economic policies will
continue to favor production methods and land uses inconsistent with a
communal system of production. The privatization of communal lands
throughout Mexico is inevitable. The Indian tribes in Mexico must either
adopt economic strategies that will promote the most profitable uses of their

527. See generally Kimberle Williams Crenshaw, Race, Reform and Retrenchment:
Transformationand Legitimation in AntidiscriminationLaw, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1331 (1988).
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lands, even if this means breaking with tribal traditions, or face the prospect
of a landless future.
As the new millennium approaches, tribal councils must begin to adapt to
the social, political, and economic environment of Mexico. By breaking
through the self-imposed barriers of isolation, the Chatino, and other tribes in
Mexico, can then begin to eliminate the external barriers of racism, poverty
and political disenfranchisement.
Conclusion
Resurrecting the ghost of Porfirian economics is a consequence of bringing
free trade to a region, like Mexico, where class divisions and monopolistic
tendencies create an unstable economic environment in which to do business.
Americans, in particular, seem to operate under the misguided belief that
developing and less-developed countries can improve their economic
conditions by simply adopting Western economic models. Mexico has
traditionally followed the United States' lead in terms of its economic policies
but has achieved only mixed results. This is attributable to the fact that the
significant cultural differences between the United States and Mexico dictate
economic models transplanted south of the border be modified to accommodate these differences. Sometimes, even with alteration, Western models
are ill-suited for transference to Mexico. Free trade falls into this latter
category." Simply stated, free trade is an exciting prospect for countries like
the United States, whose well-developed economy and stable social structure
make it highly competitive in an open international market. Mexico is situated
differently. It has a weak economy and an unstable social structure which
makes it vulnerable to the unpredictable forces of the international market.
NAFTA's chance for success in Mexico depends upon the ability of the
three governments (Mexico, Canada, and the United States) to neutralize the
forces which are responsible for its underdeveloped domestic market. One of
the chief impediments to a well-extended internal market has been Mexico's
inability to develop a true free enterprise system. In other words, Mexico,
because of its history of monopolies, does not have a financial infrastructure
which promotes open competition. The lack of free competition in the
domestic market makes it highly improbable that free trade will take hold in
the Mexican business culture.
The following recommendations focus on the steps needed to facilitate the
development of free enterprise in Mexico:
- Assert international pressure, through organizations like the International
Monetary Fund, on the Mexican banking industry to adopt commercial
lending policies that promote small business development.
- Encourage the Mexican government to adopt measures, perhaps through
reform of existing tax schedules, which will make investment in smaller
commercial enterprises more appealing.
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Encourage the government to enact, implement and enforce a more
stringent anti-trust regulatory scheme to curtail the growth of monopolies.'s
These recommendations, however, cannot effectuate significant change in
the way Mexicans "do business" unless the industrial bourgeoisie are willing
to change the status quo. Should they miss the window of opportunity for
constructive change during the early stages of NAFTA, the prospect of civil
unrest looms on the horizon.
The status of indigenous peoples in Mexico is not a burning issue for the
Mexican government until there is a crisis. Despite the existence of a federal
department to oversee the concerns of indigenous peoples, the Mexican
government's Indian policies are shortsighted and inadequate. There is a
critical need for an Indian political movement in Mexico. If conditions are to
improve for them, Indian tribes must become politically empowered.
Consequently, the following recommendation is vital:
Provide indigenous peoples with a political mechanism for fuller
participation in government decisions affecting their cultural integrity and
right of self-determination.'
Without a strong Indian voice in Mexican politics, free trade will do little
to improve their plight. If anything, the precarious status of Indians within the
Mexican economy makes them particularly vulnerable to the market
fluctuations that will undoubtedly occur once the borders of Mexico are open
to free trade.' It will take organized political action for indigenous peoples
to survive in the post-NAFrA era.

528. See also Kozolchyk, supra note 433, at 11 ("Despite an official prohibition of private
sector monopolization in a 1934 statute, monopolization and price fixing have continued to be
facets of Mexican commercial and legal life. As is apparent to any observer of Mexico's
marketplace, far from discouraging monopolies, Mexico's 1934 anti-monopoly law encouraged
price fixing and governmental market intervention while it discouraged imports.").
529. The Zapatistas have made similar demands upon the Mexican government. See, e.g.,
VDeclarationof the LacandonJungle (visited Mar. 4,1999) <http:llwww.ezln.orglarchivelquintalacandona-eng.html> (a public communique which provides an overview of the conflict between
Mexico and the Zapatistas and summarizes a revolutionary manifesto).
530. See generally Pamela Hartman, Tucson Group Aims to Help as Third World Gets
Poorer,TucsoN CMZEN, Mar. 2, 1998, at 3B (reporting that a gathering of NGOs is concerned
about the growing impoverishment of communities in Latin America because of "neo-liberal"
global economic policies).
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